RDP 2025-02: Boundedly Rational Expectations and the Optimality of Flexible Average Inflation Targeting Appendix A: Derivations
April 2025
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A.1 Unconstrained optimal policy
The unconstrained optimal policy problem is to maximise (9) subject to (10) to (13). The first-order conditions for this problem are
From (A5), we have = 0. This is Result 1. When policy is unconstrained, the IS curve is not a binding constraint. The central bank can generate whatever output gap it wants.
Substituting = 0 into (A4) gives = 0. Learners' output gap expectations enter only the IS curve. Therefore, when policy is unconstrained, there is no reason for the central bank to try to influence learners' output gap expectations.[21]
Combining (A1) and (A2) to eliminate gives Equation (14) in the main text. Similarly, using (A1) to eliminate in (A3) gives Equation (15). The remainder of the derivation for unconstrained optimal target criterion (17) is in the main text.
A.1.1 Derivation of Equation (19)
First, we rewrite in terms of expected output gaps by substituting (14) into the second right-hand side term in (15) and iterating forward to get
Then, inverting the optimal target criterion (17) gives
The equilibrium system of (10), (12) and (A6) has the following minimum state variable solution
for some constants and au, where the second equality uses the law of motion of .
A.2 Constrained optimal policy
Suppose we add to (10) to (13) some constraint on the policy rate. This could be an information constraint (21), or a ZLB constraint (32). For this optimal policy problem, the first four first-order conditions, (A1) to (A4), remain the same. But instead of (A5), we have (22), reproduced here:
where is the Lagrange multiplier on the policy rate constraint.[22]
Using (A1) to eliminate from (A2) to (A4) and then substituting in from (22) gives (25), (34) and (35), which we reproduce here:
Now substitute (34) and (35) into (25) and collect all the non- terms in , which is defined in Result 4 in the main text. This gives
where and P(L) are defined in Result 4 and P1(L–1), P2(L) and P3(L–1) are defined in Result 5. Finally, define
So we have
To get the optimal target criterion under imperfect information, Result 4, take the expectation of (A7) with respect to the central bank's information set. Since is just a multiple of , (23) implies = 0 and = 0 for any .
To get the optimal target criterion with the ZLB, Result 5, just recognise that is non-zero if and only if the ZLB is binding.
A.2.1 Derivation of Equation (31)
Start the optimal policy conditions (25), (26) and (27). Together with the Phillips curve (10) and the updating rule for learners' inflation expectations (12), these five equations determine the optimal equilibrium paths of in terms of the paths of and the cost-push shock ut.
As in the derivation of Equation (19), we can rewrite in (26) in terms of expected output gaps instead of expected inflation:
Then combining (27) and (A8) and using the minimum state variable solution to evaluate expectations terms, we can write
where ax, and au are the same constants as in (18), and and are new constants. Combining with the updating rule for learners' inflation expectations and using (21) gives the following description of optimal policy
Or, simply , where and Qu(L) are power series in L. The new parameters are
The first and third power series, Qx(L) and Qu(L), are two different weighted averages of two exponentially weighted averages of lags. The second power series, , is a weighted average of these same two exponentially weighted averages of lags, plus a third exponentially weighted average of lags, that is,
where and are the roots of and and
Footnotes
This conclusion would not hold if we had an infinite-horizon Phillips curve, as in Eusepi et al (2018), because output gap expectations would then enter the Phillips curve. [21]
A similar first-order condition would apply if, instead of a constraint on the policy rate, the loss function contained a policy rate stability or smoothing term. Then