RDP 2003-11: How Should Monetary Policy Respond to Asset-Price Bubbles? 4. Discussion and Conclusions

Table 1 provides a summary of the results. For each set of assumptions, it shows, as time proceeds and the bubble grows, whether the activist would recommend tighter (+), looser (−) or the same (=) policy settings as the sceptic.

Table 1: Activist's Policy Recommendations While the Bubble Survives
Tighter (+), looser (−), or the same as (=) the sceptic's recommendation
Scenario Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6
Policy can't affect bubble
pt = 0.2 + + + =
pt = 0.4 + + + =
Policy affects probability of bursting
p* = 0.2, δ = 0.1 + + + + + +
p* = 0.4, δ = 0.1 + +
p* = 0.4, δ = 0.2 + + +
p* = 0.4, δ = 0.3 + + + + +
Linear efficiency losses + + +
Quadratic efficiency losses + + + + + +
Policy affects bubble growth + +
Bubble bursts over two periods + + +
Rational bubble = = = = = =

There are several broad lessons worth highlighting from this summary. When the asset-price bubble is small enough, the activist policy-maker always (except in the case of the rational bubble) recommends tighter policy than the sceptic who ignores the future possible paths of the bubble. However, this result is of limited practical relevance. Although we have assumed that activist policy-makers learn about the nature of the bubble at its inception, in reality there is likely to be much doubt in the early stages about whether rising asset prices constitute a bubble. Asset-price bubbles rarely arise out of thin air – instead, they usually occur when the evolving economic fundamentals are consistent with some rise in asset prices. While there will always be some doubt about whether rising asset prices constitute a bubble, these doubts would seem particularly acute when the suspected deviation of asset prices from fundamentals remains small and has been short-lived. For these reasons, there would seem to be no strong case for central banks to respond to small asset-price misalignments.[16]

As the bubble grows, however, there are two developments with potentially conflicting implications for appropriate activist policy. On the one hand, an activist policy-maker should become increasingly confident that the observed asset-price rises do constitute a bubble, which should strengthen the case for responding actively to them. On the other hand, as the bubble grows, the potential negative effects from its eventual bursting will increase. Whether this constitutes an argument for tighter or looser policy will depend on the nature of the bubble.

The case for tightening is to offset the expansionary effects of future expected growth of the bubble and, in some formulations, to reduce the bubble's growth or help to burst it. As we have seen, there are circumstances in which this case is particularly compelling, in particular when: the probability that the bubble will burst of its own accord over the next year is assessed to be small; the bubble's probability of bursting is quite interest sensitive; efficiency losses associated with the bubble rise strongly with the bubble's size; or, the bubble's demise is expected to occur gradually over an extended period, rather than in a sudden bust. Conversely, the case for loosening is strongest when these conditions are reversed, since in those circumstances it becomes increasingly important to allow for the contractionary impact that arises when the bubble bursts.[17] The stochastic process driving the bubble is thus crucial to determining which of these considerations predominates.[18]

Ultimately, the appropriate policy strategy is a matter for judgement. Since the optimal policy response at any point depends on the stochastic properties of the bubble, our results highlight the information requirements inherent in an activist approach. Where sufficient information about the bubble process is not available to the policy-maker, a robust approach, something along the lines of the one used by our sceptic, may be the best that can be achieved. Given sufficient information about the bubble process, an activist approach may be feasible, but our results suggest that the appropriate response to bubbles is not uniform. In particular, it may be optimal to ‘lean against’ some bubbles but not others, and hence the formulation of an activist strategy requires judgments to be made about the process driving the bubble and its likely sensitivity to monetary policy.

Footnotes

Cecchetti et al (2003) also make this point when they say ‘our proposal [to raise interest rates modestly as asset prices rise above what are estimated to be warranted levels] does not call for central banks to respond to small misalignments. We agree that these are difficult to detect and are unlikely to have very strong destabilizing effects in any case’ (p 440). [16]

In a passage immediately following the one quoted in the previous footnote, Cecchetti et al (2003) say ‘… there are clearly times when egregious misalignments exist. Recent examples include Japanese stock and land prices in 1989, and the NASDAQ in late 1999 and early 2000. While some portion of these high price levels may have been justifiable based on fundamentals, few people would deny that a significant component was due to asset market disturbances. Ultimately, in terms of reducing inflation and output volatility, it is important that central bankers respond to these large relatively “obvious' misalignments” (p 440, italics added). When misalignments are large and relatively obvious, however, our results suggest that it may be unclear whether the appropriate policy response should be to raise interest rates modestly or to lower them, unless the policy-maker is able to make use of specific knowledge about the stochastic process driving the bubble. [17]

It is also possible that the probability of the bubble bursting of its own accord over the next year might rise as the bubble gets larger. If so, the case for looser, rather than tighter, policy by the activist is further strengthened, a point also made by Kent and Lowe (1997). For most of our simulations, we have assumed p* = 0.4, implying an average remaining life for the bubble of two and a half years, which may be a more plausible assumption for intermediate and larger bubbles than p* = 0.2, which implies an average remaining life of five years. [18]