Financial Stability Review – October 20253. Resilience of the Australian Financial System
Summary
The Australian financial system continues to display a high degree of resilience. Maintaining this resilience will require lending standards to remain strong in the context of lower interest rates, and participants in the financial system to further strengthen their ability to manage operational and liquidity risk in light of a complex international environment.
- Banks have maintained prudent lending standards and provisioning, are well capitalised and have large holdings of liquid assets. Despite non-performing loans (NPLs) increasing modestly, loan losses have remained very low, in part reflecting strong collateral values.
- As the superannuation industry becomes a larger component of the Australian financial system, building resilience to shocks is a priority for the sector. Historically, the superannuation system has helped to maintain financial system stability during periods of stress, aided by the industry’s structural features, which differ from some other international pension systems. Nevertheless, their sheer size means that in the future, superannuation funds will need to manage their market presence with care to avoid inadvertently amplifying stress in a severe market-wide liquidity event. The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority’s (APRA) first system risk stress test will provide further insights.
- Enhancing operational resilience and crisis preparedness is a priority across the financial system. The concurrent cyber-attacks on Australian super funds and market volatility in April add to the case that financial system participants should further strengthen their resilience to operational and liquidity shocks.
- Non-bank lenders are growing in importance in the Australian economy, but the sector’s systemic impact currently remains limited by its small size. While lending standards have remained prudent to date, strong competition among bank and non-bank lenders, most recently in business and commercial real estate lending, has the potential to culminate in an erosion of credit standards over time. Private credit funds are serving as alternative sources of financing for some businesses, and a potential source of returns for investors, though information gaps limit the ability of regulators to monitor private credit vehicles in a thorough way.
- General insurance firms remain well capitalised and profitable. Home insurance premiums remain at historically high levels, partly reflecting the increase in climate and weather events and related growth in reinsurance costs, and building cost inflation. As insurance becomes less affordable in some parts of the country, underinsurance is likely to increase over time.
- Regulators remain focused on ensuring that clearing and settlement facilities are well governed and have robust risk management frameworks. These facilities are critical to financial stability and are having to manage rapid technological and operational change and a challenging external threat environment.
3.1 Banks
Credit quality declined slightly over the first half of 2025 while losses to banks were well contained by strong collateral values.
NPLs remain small relative to banks’ capacity to absorb losses. NPLs as a share of credit – a broader measure of credit quality than loan arrears – has increased modestly since the 2022 low to 1.2 per cent in June 2025 (Graph 3.1). The share is now slightly above the pandemic-related peak, but well below the global financial crisis (GFC) highs. After contributing to the aggregate increase in NPLs in 2024, housing NPLs have stabilised in recent quarters. While the share of housing NPLs has trended up over the past two decades, this has not been accompanied by a corresponding increase in overall loan losses in part due to banks maintaining prudent lending standards, such as limiting loan-to-value ratios.1 By contrast, business NPLs have picked up over the past year, driven by loans to non-financial businesses. Overall, the share of business NPLs has remained contained in recent years, even as business insolvencies have increased sharply; most businesses entering insolvency have been of small size with little debt (see Chapter 2: Resilience of Australian Households and Businesses). The share of personal NPLs has also increased since 2022 but personal loans account for less than 5 per cent of total credit.
Banks’ loan losses have remained low since the pandemic, reflecting low arrears rates and strong collateralisation of lending. Housing price growth in recent years has helped some severely stressed mortgage borrowers repay their debts by selling their property. While this is a very disruptive adjustment for owner-occupier borrowers, it has insulated banks from losses. A severe economic shock would increase banks’ credit losses by pushing more businesses and households into stress and reducing the value of loan collateral (generally residential property), but housing prices would need to fall significantly for negative equity (and therefore losses to banks) to become widespread. Less than 1 per cent of loans are in negative equity at current housing prices (see Chapter 2: Resilience of Australian Households and Businesses) and banks consider that the bulk of housing NPLs remain well secured (Graph 3.2). If the recent increase in business insolvencies were to shift more towards businesses that owe bank debt, banks could realise higher credit losses, with around 45 per cent of business NPLs currently not classified by banks as well secured. Banks have, however, increased their loss provisions for business loans in line with the gradual rise in business NPLs that are classified as not well secured.
Australian banks are well placed to keep supporting the economy if there was an economic downturn.
The high quantity and quality of capital in the banking system means it could absorb large losses while continuing to provide credit. The banking system’s ratio of Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital – the highest quality of regulatory capital – to risk-weighted assets was 12.4 per cent in June 2025 (Graph 3.3). The changes by APRA to improve the effectiveness of bank capital in a crisis take effect from 2027 and include replacing Additional Tier 1 (AT1) capital instruments with other forms of capital considered more reliable in periods of stress. AT1 instruments issued by banks are expected to be phased out by 2032.2
Solid provisioning and profitability should also provide buffers against shocks. Both provisioning and profitability have recently stabilised at close to their pre-pandemic levels. Banks report some pressure on net interest margins (NIMs) from lending competition; however, funding costs are also decreasing as rates on deposits and wholesale funding sources decline.
Banks have significant liquid asset holdings and it is important that they can be quickly converted to cash in times of liquidity stress.
Banks hold liquid assets to ensure they can make payments to other financial institutions and to help manage large, unexpected cash outflows. Exchange Settlement (ES) balances held at the RBA are used to settle interbank payments. ES balances can be borrowed from the RBA, against high quality collateral, for short terms at an interest rate a little above the cash rate. If eligible counterparties cannot find liquidity on suitable terms in private markets or via the RBA’s open market operations (OMO), they are expected and encouraged to use the RBA’s overnight standing facility. The RBA and APRA consider the use of the overnight standing facility by banks to be consistent with routine liquidity management activities.3
The banking sector’s significant reserves of liquid assets provide a buffer for unexpected shocks. Banks’ liquidity ratios remain above pre-pandemic levels and well above regulatory requirements (Graph 3.4). However, given the rapid nature of deposit runs in the digital era, the ability for banks to monetise their liquid asset portfolios in a severe liquidity stress event, with limited erosion of value, is a vulnerability for banking systems globally, including in Australia. Banks with concentrated asset holdings in particular markets, such as bank debt securities, could struggle to sell those securities without reducing their value and liquidity during the sale. This could impact other banks that hold the same securities (see Box: Interconnections between Australian banks and non-bank financial institutions) and further propagate stress. The RBA’s OMO helps to mitigate this vulnerability; under the RBA’s ‘ample reserves with full allotment’ system, eligible counterparties can borrow as many ES balances as they demand at weekly OMO against eligible collateral. APRA’s targeted changes to minimum liquidity holdings (MLH) banks’ liquidity requirements are also expected to limit the potential for liquidity stress to propagate through the financial system; MLH banks are required to report the market value of their liquid assets from 1 July 2025 and APRA expects MLH banks to take steps to improve the diversification of their liquidity portfolios.4 A decision on phasing out bank debt securities as liquid assets to meet MLH requirements has been deferred to be considered as part of a broader APRA review of liquidity risk.
The Council of Financial Regulators (CFR) Review into Small and Medium-sized Banks sought to support competition without negatively affecting the stability of the Australian financial system.
The CFR Review examined the role of small and medium-sized banks in providing competition, the regulatory and market trends affecting their competitiveness, and sources of, and barriers to, competition. Released in August, the Review was requested by the Treasurer and conducted by the CFR agencies in consultation with the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission.5 Nine recommendations were made for the government and nine actions were identified for regulators. The proposed measures are aimed at providing more proportionate regulation, addressing barriers to entry, sustainability and scale, and increasing funding access, to assist in improving the competitiveness of small and medium-sized banks in Australia. The Australian Government has accepted in-principle eight of the nine recommendations and will work with the CFR agencies on the actions and recommendations.6 The Government will seek further feedback on the ninth recommendation for APRA to introduce a lighter touch framework for very small banks, which would be accompanied by adjustments to the Financial Claims Scheme.
Australian financial institutions are facing a more complex risk environment where shocks may coincide.
The increasing complexity and volatility in the operating environment for financial institutions raises new risk management challenges. Technological innovation is expanding the set of financial products available and changing the delivery of financial services, facilitating the entrance of new providers, and changing the ways that risks arise and are managed. Greater adoption of digital technologies in financial institutions increases the technological complexity of their systems and the potential for operational incidents to occur, including technological outages and reputational risks if data integrity is compromised.7 This risk environment may complicate an institution’s response, including communication strategies. In certain circumstances, operational events could amplify financial risks to an institution.8
Ensuring operational resilience in financial institutions, including their outsourced operations, remains critical. APRA’s new prudential standard on operational risk management, CPS 230, commenced in July 2025. It is aimed at ensuring APRA-regulated entities, including superannuation funds, are resilient to operational risks and related disruptions.9 It also requires entities to manage the risks arising from the use of material service providers. If critical operations delivered by material service providers are concentrated in a small number of providers, incidents at those providers have the potential to cause systemic impacts. CFR agencies are working together and with industry to improve the resilience of the Australian financial system as it becomes increasingly digitalised.10
Box: Interconnections between Australian banks and non-bank financial institutions
Interconnections between sectors of the Australian financial system can increase efficiency but also act as transmission channels for stress.
The Australian financial system collectively holds around $14 trillion in assets, amounting to about 500 per cent of GDP. Banks are the most systemically important sector, reflecting both their size (42 per cent of financial system assets) and key role as providers of credit in the economy. Non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs) cover a diverse range of financial institutions that operate without banking licences, such as superannuation funds, insurers, non-bank lenders and investment funds. NBFIs collectively account for roughly half of financial system assets in Australia, and approximately half of these assets are in the superannuation sector (around 28 per cent of system assets). The NBFI share of system assets is somewhat smaller than for other advanced economies.
Within the Australian financial system, there are now significant financial and non-financial interconnections between sectors. At one level, these linkages can be beneficial as they can make the system more efficient and, in some cases, more resilient. However, a high degree of interconnectedness can also transmit or amplify stress and contagion in the financial system. Visibility of these linkages is uneven, as not all NBFIs are prudentially regulated, and reporting requirements vary across the institutions. This opacity could mean that vulnerabilities build up unnoticed (or unmanaged) for some time. APRA’s system risk stress test will help increase understanding of the risk transmission mechanisms between the largest sectors in the financial system.11
Financial linkages between sectors can be classified as direct or indirect. Australian financial institutions are directly connected through debt and equity obligations to each other, creating mutual vulnerabilities. Borrowers are exposed if lenders withdraw or refuse to roll funding; lenders are exposed if borrowers default. Institutions are indirectly connected through common market exposures. Market dysfunction or fire sales are key transmission channels to spread stress through indirect linkages.
For financial stability monitoring, it is useful to assess which markets have a large share of concentrated asset ownership. This helps to provide information about how indirect and direct linkages may transmit stress through the financial system in a severe stress event. Focusing primarily on material domestic sector holdings, in key Australian markets, ABS data show that ownership tends to be concentrated in banks and superannuation funds.
- Australian Government Securities (AGS) and Australian state and territory long-term debt (semi-government securities, or ‘semis’) form the bulk of available high quality liquid assets (HQLA) for Australian banks and underpin much of the domestic collateralised lending markets.12 Concentration in AGS markets is generally low, while concentration in the semis market is high, with banks holding more than half of semis outstanding. Hedge funds are also active in AGS markets, diversifying the investor base and increasing market turnover.13 Hedge funds tend to hold leveraged positions, trade their positions more actively than buy and hold investors, and may have lower tolerance for absorbing losses. If hedge funds are forced to rapidly unwind their positions during a market stress event, it could impair market functioning.
- Ownership concentration in the bank bills market is high and skewed towards superannuation funds and managed funds, which manage a significant share of superannuation funds’ investments. If superannuation funds sought to redeem a significant share of their bank bills simultaneously, bank bill swap rate (BBSW) spreads would increase and short-term bank funding would likely be reduced. This would transmit higher rates to other linked markets, as observed at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.14 The direct impact on banks would be broader, as a significant share of banks’ other wholesale debt and deposit funding costs are also linked to BBSW, either directly or as part of their interest rate hedging practices.15
- Bank bond markets are somewhat concentrated, with smaller banks holding significant allocations to fulfil their regulatory requirements under the MLH regime. Superannuation funds also hold a notable share (Graph 3.5). Forced selling during a crisis would also increase bank funding costs and could impair market liquidity and pricing, exacerbating stress in the financial system.
- Corporate bonds and listed equities market ownership is concentrated in superannuation funds and managed funds, as the largest domestic holders. Insurers also have a high allocation to corporate bond markets (relative to their size) as they tend to invest in medium-to-long-term fixed-income products to match their policy liabilities. This indirectly exposes insurers to super funds (and vice versa).
3.2 Non-bank financial institutions (NBFIs)
The superannuation sector has historically been a key source of support to the Australian financial system, althoughits size now means it has the potential to amplify stress under severe scenarios.
The superannuation sector continues to grow, increasing its importance to the Australian financial system and economy. The value of assets managed by the superannuation sector was $4.3 trillion, around 160 per cent of GDP, in June 2025. Around two-thirds of those assets are managed by APRA-regulated funds, the largest and most systemically important type of funds. APRA-regulated funds hold a significant share of domestic financial assets (Graph 3.6). Understanding the implications for financial stability of this growing sector is a priority for APRA and the CFR agencies.16
Superannuation funds have long-term investment horizons, and structural features of the industry mean they have been less likely than others to amplify short-term market sell-offs. Superannuation funds have generally tended to dampen price declines by investing countercyclically; increasing asset purchases when their prices fall. Restrictions on superannuation funds from directly taking on leverage, and steady liquidity inflows from member contributions in the accumulation phase can support this stabilising tendency of superannuation. APRA-regulated funds are also mostly defined-contribution funds that do not guarantee returns to members, in contrast to some large pension fund systems in other jurisdictions. This means investment losses are borne by fund members, reducing household wealth, but the losses do not threaten the viability of superannuation funds or their counterparties.17 Regulated funds hold large buffers of liquid assets and implement other liquidity management strategies to manage potential outflows, for example, due to members switching between funds or between asset allocations or margin calls on foreign exchange derivatives contracts.
If a severe and unexpected liquidity shock occurs, superannuation funds could raise liquidity in ways that may amplify financial market stress (see Box: Interconnections between Australian banks and non-bank financial institutions). As the sector expands in size relative to domestic markets, it is expected to continue increasing its exposure to foreign assets and its foreign exchange hedging to mitigate market risk.18 In turn, funds’ exposures to rollover risk and margin calls may also increase. Funds manage liquidity risks related to foreign exchange hedging in various ways, including by spreading their maturities over time. The sector is also expected to continue increasing investment in unlisted assets, which are difficult to liquidate quickly.19 If system-wide early withdrawals and additional withdrawals from members in retirement were to occur abruptly and unexpectedly this could also create liquidity pressure. If several risks materialised simultaneously, funds might need to secure liquidity in ways that could amplify financial market stress. APRA’s system risk stress test conducted this year will provide regulators with a better understanding of potential stress transmission channels between the super sector and banks during a significant financial market disruption alongside a major operational risk event.20
April’s cyber-attack on Australia’s large superannuation funds demonstrated the potentially damaging impact of cyber-attacks on the financial sector. Several large superannuation funds were the victims of credential stuffing attacks in April 2025. While most attempts to breach funds’ cyber-defences were unsuccessful, a small number of members were impacted.21 The cyber-attacks also coincided with the tariff-related market volatility event (see Box: April market volatility), adding to the overall complexity of the incident.22 The interaction of market volatility and more severe cyber incidents at superannuation funds could undermine confidence in a fund or the sector more broadly, prompting members to switch investment options or (for those in the decumulation phase) withdraw funds from the system. It could also disrupt members’ ability to access much needed income. In recognition of these extreme but plausible scenarios, APRA is engaging closely with industry, including on risks related to material service providers. APRA’s CPS 230 prudential standard should strengthen operational resilience of APRA-regulated funds and provide more insight into operational vulnerabilities in the sector.
Box: April market volatility
April’s market volatility event did not give rise to major financial stability concerns in Australia.
Larger and broader than expected US tariffs announced on 2 April 2025 caused some short-lived disruption in financial markets globally, including in Australia. Equity prices and many commodity prices initially fell sharply, and expected volatility in US equity markets rose to levels not seen since the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic (see Chapter 1: The Global Macro-financial Environment). Australian equity prices fell, including banks and financials, the Australian dollar depreciated, and liquidity in the Australian bond market declined sharply as a significant number of participants sought to unwind common positions quickly. Market moves were quickly unwound as the implementation of the tariffs was paused.
The Australian financial system weathered the episode reasonably well. Despite the price moves, Australian markets continued to function adequately throughout the period of volatility; assets repriced and indicators of liquidity widened sharply in some markets but there was no broad-based shift to cash. In AGS markets, the moves were sizable but the reduction in trading positions and deterioration in market functioning was much smaller than that experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic.23 There was a relatively modest increase in demand at the RBA’s weekly OMO operations, which helped to support system liquidity and ensure the shock was not amplified in broader markets.24 Liaison with superannuation funds suggests that the increase in liquidity needs due to member switching and liquidity needs associated with foreign exchange hedges was manageable.
The short duration of the event helped to limit its impact, but risks to the Australian financial system from global spillovers remain elevated.
The April volatility event highlighted the ongoing risks faced by the Australian financial system through its connections to overseas markets. Shocks can be transmitted through financial institutions’ direct exposures to international markets, such as funding raised overseas or foreign asset and currency holdings, and through overseas investors’ actions in Australian markets. Financial institutions are also indirectly exposed to shocks through customers and industries with international exposures. Australian institutions take actions to mitigate these risks, for example, through hedging exposures or holding foreign currency denominated high-quality liquid assets. While the short duration of the April event helped to limit its impact, 4.1 Focus Topic analyses how overseas shocks could test the resilience of the Australian financial system.
The risk to financial stability posed by the non-bank lender sector in Australia is contained.
Non-bank lenders comprise a growing source of finance in the Australian economy, but the sector’s systemic importance remains limited by its small size. Non-bank lenders – lenders that are restricted from offering deposits – account for 6 per cent of financial system assets. Roughly half of those assets are accounted for by registered financial corporations (RFCs). Like banks, RFCs engage in liquidity transformation to extend longer term credit to households and businesses. RFCs continued to grow their market share of housing and business lending over the first few months of 2025, but the pace of growth is slowing (Graph 3.7). The growth in housing lending continued to be supported by strong investor demand for securitisations, making it cheaper for RFCs to fund housing lending.
RFC’s credit quality appears sound, but it is important for regulators to continue monitoring lending standards. The share of RFCs’ housing lending in arrears remains a little below 1 per cent, slightly above the share at banks. There is limited visibility over the level of business loan arrears; liaison suggests arrears rates have increased slightly but remain contained. While current lending standards have remained prudent (see Chapter 2: Resilience of Australian Households and Businesses), strong lending competition among banks and non-bank lenders, including private credit firms, could be a concern if it leads to an erosion of credit standards. Private markets play an important role in funding growth and innovation in the economy, but limited visibility over activity in these markets restricts the ability of regulators to assess (and respond to) risks that could emerge in a timely way. After collecting feedback from industry, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) is planning to investigate data collection options to better understand developments in private markets.25
The general insurance sector is not currently a source of financial stability concern, but declining insurance affordability could undermine resilience in the longer term.
The general insurance sector remains well capitalised and profitable. The sector’s capital ratios are well above APRA’s prescribed capital amount. Profitability in the sector has recently been supported by low claims, higher premiums and a moderation in the growth of reinsurance costs. Insurers remained resilient to recent severe weather events in Australia, despite paying an estimated $1.8 billion of claims to affected households and businesses.26
Home insurance premiums remain at historically high levels, decreasing insurance affordability and potential future resilience. While lenders require borrowers to have property insurance when a loan is first obtained, lenders do not have complete visibility of whether this insurance is maintained over time. As insurance premiums rise, homeowners may reduce coverage, resulting in underinsurance. Underinsurance is a financial stability concern as it lowers the credit quality of existing mortgage loans. Survey information shows that 4 per cent of households have identified living in properties that are uninsured and 7 per cent in underinsured properties.27 As climate and weather events increase due to climate change, affordability is likely to decrease further, particularly in areas at higher risk of natural disasters. Increasing building and repair costs also impact affordability. APRA’s Climate Vulnerability Assessment will help to quantify how general insurance affordability may be impacted by climate change in the medium term, with the results due to be released in late 2025 or 2026.28
3.3 Financial market infrastructures (FMIs)
Resilient FMIs are crucial to financial stability.
ASX has been under heightened regulatory scrutiny following recent operational issues. The December 2024 CHESS batch settlement incident exposed serious deficiencies in ASX’s management of operational risk. Although the incident had a limited impact on financial stability, it could have had more severe consequences if it had not occurred at a time of relatively low trading volumes. Subsequent developments this year have underscored concerns about ASX’s risk management and the potential impacts of disruptions at clearing and settlement facilities. For example, in April 2025, ASX was concerned that it could breach a virtual memory limit that could have caused the CHESS settlement batch to fail; the December 2024 incident was caused by a similar memory issue.29 The April issue occurred alongside higher market volatility and trading volumes associated with US tariff announcements. A disruption to equity clearing and settlement during this period could have had adverse implications for financial stability.
Regulators have taken steps to ensure that ASX operates core systems reliably and improves its approach to risk management. The RBA has required ASX to outline and implement plans to enhance its resourcing and contingency arrangements for the current CHESS system. ASIC directed ASX to engage an independent expert to review the CHESS system and is also undertaking a wide-ranging inquiry into ASX focusing on governance, capability and risk management. ASX recognises the need to overhaul its risk culture and management, and has announced a multi-year risk transformation program. The RBA and ASIC continue to consider whether additional regulatory measures are required to promote financial system stability.
Endnotes
See RBA (2025), ‘Box: Understanding the Long-run Increase in Banks’ Housing Loan Arrears’, Financial Stability Review, April. 1
APRA (2025), ‘Removing Additional Tier 1 Capital from the Prudential Framework’, Consultation Paper, July. 2
APRA and RBA (2025), ‘Joint APRA-RBA Statement on Use of the RBA’s Overnight Standing Facility’, Media Release No 11-2025, 2 April. 3
APRA (2024), ‘APRA Finalises Targeted Changes to Strengthen Banks’ Liquidity and Capital Requirements’, Media Release, 24 July. 4
CFR (2025), ‘Review into Small and Medium-sized Banks’, Report, August. 5
Australian Treasury (2025), ‘Response to the Council of Financial Regulators Small and Medium Banks Review’, 6 August. 6
RBA (2023), ‘5.5 Focus Topic: Operational Risk in a Digital World’, Financial Stability Review, October. 7
Bank of England (2025), ‘Financial Stability in Focus: The FPC’s Macroprudential Approach to Operational Resilience’, March. 8
APRA (2025), ‘Prudential Standard CPS 230: Operational Risk Management’, July. 9
RBA (2025), ‘4.2 Focus Topic: Looking at Digitalisation through a Financial Stability Lens’, Financial Stability Review, April. 10
APRA (2025), ‘APRA Publishes 2025-26 Corporate Plan’, Media Release, 21 August. 11
RBA (2024), ‘The Australian Repo Market: A Short History and Recent Evolution’, RBA Bulletin, July. 12
AOFM (2025), ‘The Role of Hedge Funds in the Australian Government Securities Market’, AOFM Investor Highlights, July. 13
RBA (2022), ‘Australian Money Markets through the COVID-19 Pandemic’, RBA Bulletin, March. 14
RBA (2025), ‘Bank Funding in 2024’, RBA Bulletin, April. 15
CFR (2025), ‘Quarterly Statement by the Council of Financial Regulators’, Media Release No 2024-05, 3 December. 16
The impact of investment losses on fund members depends on how close to retirement they are and whether the losses are sustained. Members that are in or close to the decumulation phase may be forced to realise losses, which will affect their retirement income. 17
Hauser A (2025), ‘A Hedge Between Keeps Friendship Green: Could Global Fragmentation Change the Way Australian Investors Think About Currency Risk?’, Remarks delivered to the Board of CLS Bank International, Sydney, 16 September. 18
APRA (2024), ‘Governance of Unlisted Asset Valuation and Liquidity Risk Management in Superannuation’, December. 19
APRA (2025), ‘APRA Corporate Plan 2025-26’, August. 20
ASFA (2025), ‘ASFA Statement on Attempted Cyber Security Breaches’, Media Release, 4 April. 21
APRA (2025), ‘APRA Releases Notes on Superannuation Industry Roundtable from July 2025 following Cyber Incidents’, 11 August. 22
RBA (2025), ‘Chapter 2: Australian Financial Conditions’, Statement on Monetary Policy, May. 23
Jacobs D (2025), ‘Australia’s Bond Market in a Volatile World’, Address to Australian Government Fixed Income Forum, 12 June. 24
Constant S (2025), ‘Here to Stay, Here to Grow: The Future of Australia’s Public and Private Markets’, Remarks at the Conexus Fiduciary Investors Symposium, Blue Mountains, 4 June. For the latest information on ASIC’s work on private credit, see ASIC (2025), ‘Advancing Australia’s Public and Private Markets: Progress Update’, Media Release, 22 September. 25
Insurance Council of Australia (2025), ‘Extreme Weather Losses in 2025 Exceed $1.8 Billion’, Media Release, 2 July. 26
The information is from the annual Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia Survey, which included questions on home and contents insurance affordability this year. 27
APRA, n 20. 28
RBA (2025), ‘Assessment of ASX Clearing and Settlement Facilities’, September. 29