# Evaluating Exchange Rate Regimes: a Natural Experiment?

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December, 2025


- We revisit the question of the **optimal exchange rate policy** in Small Open Economies (SOE).
- Old question: Friedman (1953) "The case for flexible exchange rates":
  - Prices are sticky.
  - Let the exchange rate do the adjustment.
  - Spain and Portugal 2009-12.
- "Fear of Floating" in practice. Calvo and Reinhart (2002).

- Want a model with realistic real exchange rate behavior.
- Focus on role of primary commodities in SOE.
- Primary commodity prices (PCP)
  - are particularly volatile and persistent
  - correlate with relevant variables (RER, output).
  - exogenous in SOE.
- Very simple model reproduces salient features of data.


- Study the interaction of
  - shocks to the terms of trade (PCP).
  - frictions in the setting of **both** prices and wages
- If only one friction, the nominal exchange rate movements fixes it.
- One example with rigid wages: Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016).

- We use two paradigmatic examples.
  - Chile "floats" since 2001.
  - Ecuador "hard peg" also since 2001.
- In both countries exports of PC around 20% of GDP (over 80% copper in Chile and almost 50% oil in Ecuador).
- Almost a natural experiment?

#### Inflation in Chile and Ecuador



## GDP per capita in Chile and Ecuador




- We use Chilean data (floater) to calibrate the model.
- Simple NK model with Calvo-type frictions in prices and wages.
- Augmented with:
  - A sector that produces an exportable primary commodity.
  - Exogenous shocks to PC prices, and TFP.

- The model replicates key moments in the data.
- Some degree of "fear of floating" is optimal.
- The right amount of "fear" depends much on details.
- Fully floating dominates a hard peg, with welfare gain around 0.03 percentage points of lifetime consumption.
- The model ignores lack of commitment and assumes that the price level can be perfectly targeted.

#### Plan


- Data for Chile.
- Model.
- Calibration and Simulations.
- Welfare Analysis.
- Data for Ecuador

## Chile and copper



Note: Quarterly data. HP-filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Correlation is -0.6.

## Impulse response to negative shock to the price of copper



**Note**: VAR with price of copper in constant USD, real GDP, and real exchange rate. VAR identified using exogeneity of price of copper. Data are hp-filtered.

## Model with flexible prices and financial autarky

- Labor only economy.
- Produces
  - a **traded** primary commodity using labor and an endowment (oil, land)
  - a **nontraded** final good using labor, the locally produced commodity and an imported input
- Preferences

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ u(c_t) - h(n_t + I_t) \right]$$

- n<sub>t</sub> is labor allocated to the final non-traded
- $l_t$  is labor allocated to the primary commodity.

## Thus

Final good technology

$$X_t = A_t (E)^{\phi} (I_t)^{(1-\phi)}$$

 $v_t = Z_t (n_t)^{\eta_1} (x_t)^{\eta_2} (m_t)^{\eta_3}$ 

 $P_{t} = k \frac{1}{Z_{t}} (W_{t})^{\eta_{1}} (P_{t}^{x})^{\eta_{2}} (P_{t}^{m})^{\eta_{3}}$ 

SO

$$W_t = (1 - \phi) P_t^{x} A_t \left(\frac{E}{I_t}\right)^{\phi}$$

$$P_t = k' rac{\mathcal{A}_t^{\eta_1}}{\mathcal{Z}_t} \left(rac{\mathcal{E}}{I_t}
ight)^{\phi\eta_1} \left(P_t^{\mathsf{x}}
ight)^{\eta_1+\eta_2} \left(P_t^{\mathsf{m}}
ight)^{\eta_3}$$

Law of one price

$$P_t^x = S_t P_t^{x*}$$
  
$$P_t^m = S_t P_t^{m*}$$

- Then,

$$P_t = k' rac{\mathcal{A}_t^{\eta_1}}{\mathcal{Z}_t} \left(rac{\mathcal{E}}{l_t}
ight)^{\phi\eta_1} \left(S_t P_t^{\chi*}
ight)^{\eta_1+\eta_2} \left(S_t P_t^{m*}
ight)^{\eta_3}$$

- or

$$P_t = P_t^{USA} S_t \left[ k' \frac{A_t^{\eta_1}}{Z_t} \left( \frac{E}{I_t} \right)^{\phi \eta_1} \left( \frac{P_t^{X*}}{P_t^{USA}} \right)^{\eta_1 + \eta_2} \left( \frac{P_t^{m*}}{P_t^{USA}} \right)^{\eta_3} \right]$$

- If we let  $\xi_t$  be the real exchange rate:

$$\xi_t = \frac{P_t^{USA}S_t}{P_t} = \frac{1}{MC_t^*}$$

where

$$extit{MC}_t^* = \left[ k' rac{A_t^{\eta_1}}{Z_t} \left( rac{E}{I_t} 
ight)^{\phi \eta_1} \left( rac{P_t^{X*}}{P_t^{USA}} 
ight)^{\eta_1 + \eta_2} \left( rac{P_t^{m*}}{P_t^{USA}} 
ight)^{\eta_3} 
ight]$$

is the marginal cost in constant USD.

#### **Quantitative Model**

- Add Calvo frictions in prices and wages.
- Accumulation of foreign liabilities:

$$\frac{D_{t+1}}{1+r_t} - D_t + P_t^{x*} (X_t - x_t) - P_t^{z*} z_t = 0.$$

#### Numerical experiments

- We abstract from implementation.
- Monetary policy can set a nominal variable.
- Given the frictions, natural policy to considers trades-off  $P_t$  vs  $W_t$ .
- Will consider a policy that trades off  $P_t$  versus  $S_t$ 
  - Chile targets nominal prices: inflation targeting.
  - Ecuador: dollarization equivalent to a fixed exchange rate regime.

## "Fear of floating" policy

- Recall that

$$P_t = \frac{\theta_p}{\theta_p - 1} S_t M C_t^*$$

- Policy of the form

$$\log\left(\frac{S_{t+1}}{S_t}\right) = -\nu\log\left(\frac{MC_{t+1}^*}{MC_t^*}\right).$$

- $\nu = 0$  is a peg.
- $\nu = 1$  is pure inflation targeting.
- $0 < \nu < 1$  is "fear of floating".

#### **Calibration**

- Preferences of the form

$$U(C_t, L_t) = \frac{C_t^{1-\gamma} - 1}{1-\gamma} - \varphi \frac{(\bar{L} - L_t)^{1+\psi}}{1+\psi}.$$

- Elasticity of labor supply:  $\psi = 3$ .
- Fraction of the workforce in commodity sector is 5%.
- Share parameters in final goods:  $\eta_1 = 0.03$ ,  $\eta_2 = 0.24$ ,  $\eta_3 = 0.73$ .
- Commodity production: elasticity of substitution  $\omega = 0.15$ .
- Process for commodity prices  $P_t^{X*}$ . Volatility = 0.14, persistence = 0.97.
- Price stickiness parameters:
  - $\alpha^p = 0.5$
  - $-\alpha^{w} = 0.75$

## Baseline parameters

Parameter	Description	Value
β	Discount factor (utility, annualized)	0.96
$\gamma$	Risk aversion (utility)	2
$\psi$	Exponent leisure (utility)	3
ω	Elasticity of substitution in commodity technology	0.15
ho	Share of labor in commodities technology	0.10
$\eta_1$	Share of home commodity in final goods	0.03
$\eta_2$	Share of foreign commodity in final goods	0.24
$\eta_3$	Share of labor in final goods	0.73
$\alpha^p$	Calvo parameter prices	0.50
$\alpha_{W}$	Calvo parameter wages	0.75
$ heta_{\mathcal{P}}$	Elasticity of subst. intermediate varieties	6
$\theta^{W}$	Elasticity of subst. labor varieties	6
$\rho_X$	Coefficient on lagged value home commodity price	0.97
$\sigma_{X}$	Standard deviation shock to home commodity price	0.14

## Moments Chile and Inflation targeting


	Chile	Model
std(GDP)	1.6	1.6
$std(p^{x*})$	18.4	18.4
std(RER)	5.5	6.8
$corr(RER, p^{x*})$	-0.75	-0.83
corr(RER,GDP)	-0.46	0.20
corr(GDP,p <sup>x*</sup> )	0.56	0.29

Data and model are HP-filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600.

#### Welfare analysis

- Compute the welfare gain relative to a peg by moving the "fear of floating" parameter  $\nu$ .
- Simulate model with all shocks
- Baseline economy
- Economies with different degrees of price stickiness and elasticities.


## Welfare gain over hard peg ( $\nu = 0$ )



#### Welfare analysis


- Some degree of "fear of floating" is optimal.
- The exact amount is sensitive to details.
- Pure inflation targeting dominates a peg unless wages are extremely rigid.

#### **Ecuador**



Note: Quarterly data. HP-filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Correlation is 0.9 for multi and 0.76 for bilateral


## Ecuador: impulse response to negative oil price shock




Note: VAR with oil price in constant USD, real GDP, and real exchange rate. VAR identified using exogeneity of oil price. Data is hp-filterd. In red, Chile's impulse response.

#### Price and wage stickiness don't do the job!

- Impulse response under a peg for different degrees of stickiness.




#### Other Peg: Saudi Arabia and oil




Note: Quarterly data. HP-filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Correlation is 0.46.

#### Impulse response to positive shock to the price of oil




**Note**: VAR with price of oil in constant USD, and real exchange rate. VAR identified using exogeneity of price of oil. Data are hp-filtered.

## Other floater: Norway and oil




Note: Quarterly data. HP-filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Correlation is -0.5.

#### Impulse response to positive shock to the price of oil




**Note**: VAR with price of oil in constant USD, and real exchange rate. VAR identified using exogeneity of price of oil. Data are hp-filtered.

#### What about Australia and iron?



Note: Quarterly data. HP-filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Correlation is -0.5.


#### Impulse response to positive shock to the price of iron



**Note**: VAR with price of iron in constant USD, and real exchange rate. VAR identified using exogeneity of price of iron. Data are hp-filtered.


# **THANKS!**

#### Australia and coal



Note: Quarterly data. HP-filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600. Correlation is 0.32.

#### Impulse response to positive shock to the price of coal




**Note**: VAR with price of coal in constant USD, and real exchange rate. VAR identified using exogeneity of price of iron. Data are hp-filtered.

## Moments Ecuador and fixed exchange rate

	Ecuador	Model (only $p^{x*}$ )
$std(p^{x*})$	21.5	21.4
std(GDP)	1.8	3.1
std(RER)	1.5	6.4
$corr(RER, p^{x*})$	0.76	-0.74
corr(RER,GDP)	0.30	-0.26
$corr(GDP, p^{x*})$	0.47	0.83


Data and model are HP-filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600.

#### Ecuador: impulse response to negative oil price shock



Note: VAR with oil price in constant USD, real GDP, real exchange rate, government expenditures, and soverign spread. VAR identified using exogeneity of oil price. Data is hp-filtered.


## Chile: impulse response to negative copper price shock




Note: VAR with copper price in constant USD, real GDP, real exchange rate, government expenditures, and soverign spread. VAR identified using exogeneity of oil price. Data is hp-filtered.

## **APPENDIX**


#### Impulse responses inflation targeting




## Impulse responses inflation targeting



#### Impulse responses inflation targeting (long horizon)



## Impulse responses inflation targeting (long horizon)



## Moments Chile and Inflation targeting

	Chile	Model	Only $p^{x*}$	No <i>A</i> <sup>x</sup>	No A <sup>y</sup>
std(RER)	5.5	6.8	5.7	6.7	6.5
std(GDP)	1.6	1.6	0.8	1.6	1.1
$std(p^{x*})$	18.4	18.4	18.4	18.4	18.4
$corr(RER, p^{x*})$	-0.75	-0.83	-0.97	-0.82	-0.85
corr(RER,GDP)	-0.46	0.20	-0.40	0.20	0.03
corr(GDP,p <sup>x*</sup> )	0.56	0.29	0.61	0.32	0.43

Data and model are HP-filtered with a smoothing parameter of 1600.

## Model moments small sample distributions

