

# Gross Migration, Housing and Urban Population Dynamics\*

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## Abstract

We quantify the influence of migration and housing on urban population dynamics using a dynamic general equilibrium model of cities incorporating a new theory of migration motivated by patterns uncovered in a panel of US cities. Cities experience near random walk productivity shocks, yet population is slow to adjust. We show that measuring and modeling *gross* migration is essential to quantifying these dynamics. Housing matters because it is immobile, slow to build, and is durable. We use our data and additional evidence to calibrate the model, finding a city's population, gross migration, employment, wages, home construction and house prices respond to productivity shocks much as we estimate they do in our data. Costs of finding better cities to live and work drive slow population adjustments in the short run with housing playing a limited role. We also find that migration costs could be important for understanding persistent urban decline.

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## 1. Introduction

As we document in this paper, cities experience significant, random-walk-like productivity shocks, yet population is very slow to adjust. This evidence suggests there are substantial barriers to geographical labor reallocation within the US. What are these barriers? Urban population dynamics are the result of many individual decisions about whether to leave one's current location and if so where to move to. Hence the costs and benefits underlying gross migration decisions are a natural starting point for understanding slow population adjustment. Previous research suggests that housing may be important as well. The reasons are that it is difficult to move, requires time-to-build to accommodate an increasing population, and a large durable housing stock makes a city attractive to potential migrants.

We study how migration and housing frictions drive slow population adjustments by developing a quantitative dynamic general equilibrium model of cities and comparing it to panel data from 365 US cities over the period 1985-2007. We find that gross in-migration is linearly increasing in net migration and that in-migration rises and out-migration falls following positive productivity shocks. These findings suggest that an empirically plausible model of gross migration should embody some form of directed migration which allows in-migration to vary systematically with net migration. We also show that the linear relation between gross and net migration has crucial implications for measuring adjustment costs in net migration.

Building on [Kennan and Walker \(2011\)](#) (hereafter KW), large gross flows arise in our model from idiosyncratic shocks to workers' tastes for their current cities over others. When considering a move workers understand the distribution of city types but not the location of any particular type of city. They can pay a variable cost to find a particular city type or pay a fixed cost to be randomly allocated. Costly directed migration captures the myriad ways in which workers find a given type of city, including active recruitment by firms and cities and informal networking. Random matching accounts for intangible factors that influence location choices such

as to be near family members. Since employing more of the existing population is a natural substitute for migration to accommodate higher labor demand, labor supply is endogenous in our model as well.

We integrate this theory of migration and labor supply into an otherwise familiar generalization of the neoclassical growth model. Each city produces a unique good using locally supplied workers and freely mobile equipment capital, subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks. These locally produced goods are imperfectly substitutable inputs into the production of the freely tradeable final goods, consumption and equipment. Individuals enjoy consumption and housing services in the same city they work with housing services derived from locally produced, immobile and durable residential structures.

The model is calibrated using observations different from those we use for its validation. We validate the calibrated model by comparing how population, gross migration, employment, wages, residential investment and house prices respond to productivity shocks with estimates of the same objects based on our panel. The model does surprisingly well along these dimensions and importantly it is consistent with the slow response of population even though this evidence is not targeted in our calibration. We also find that the model is broadly consistent with the unconditional volatility, contemporaneous co-movement, and persistence of the key variables, and that productivity shocks alone account for about 60% of the variation in local population growth.

Having established the empirical relevance of our model, we use it to examine how migration and housing influence population adjustments. We find that workers' costs of finding new cities to live and work essentially account on their own for the slow population adjustments we observe. This suggests that the myriad ways individuals get informed about desirable locations to live and work represent significant barriers to rapid population reallocation. That we identify the model's migration parameters without consideration of within-city dynamic responses to productivity shocks lends

substantial credibility to this interpretation. In the absence of migration frictions, costs of producing durable, immobile housing do lower the amplitude and increase the persistence of population’s response to a productivity shock. However, if migration frictions are already present, adding those for housing does virtually nothing to influence population dynamics.

There is evidence of persistent urban decline in our panel with many cities experiencing declining populations throughout the sample period. [Glaeser and Gyourko \(2005\)](#) argue that housing’s immobility and durability account for persistent urban decline and they dismiss a role for migration (see pp. 368–369). The declining cities in our sample also experience declining relative productivity, suggesting that our model might account for persistent urban decline as well as the short run population dynamics that are the primary focus of this paper. We find that it does, through the slow response of population to past declines in productivity. This suggests that migration frictions could be a major factor in urban decline even though, as emphasized by [Glaeser and Gyourko \(2005\)](#), rates of in-migration remain high in declining cities.<sup>1</sup>

Our model is a dynamic version of the classic [Roback \(1982\)](#) and [Rosen \(1979\)](#) static model of cities with costless mobility.<sup>2</sup> We build on an extensive empirical and theoretical microeconomic literature on migration, surveyed by [Greenwood \(1997\)](#) and [Lucas \(1997\)](#). [KW](#) is an important recent contribution. They analyze individual migration decisions in the face of wage shocks, idiosyncratic location-preference shocks, and moving costs, but without housing or equilibrium interactions. [KW](#) use their estimated model to calculate the speed of adjustment of state populations to

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<sup>1</sup>Our model abstracts from the persistent decline in gross migration that has been modeled by [Karahan and Rhee \(2013\)](#) and [Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl \(2012\)](#). It is an open question whether the mechanisms we emphasize would interact with the ones that have been used to explain the trend.

<sup>2</sup>Because it is static, the Roback-Rosen model does not address migration or population adjustments to shocks. [Van Nieuwerburgh and Weil \(2010\)](#) introduce dynamics to this framework. Their model has implications for net migration, but not gross flows. [Coen-Pirani \(2010\)](#) also constructs a dynamic Roback-Rosen model, studying gross population flows among US states in a framework similar to the one used by [Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger \(2011\)](#) and others to study gross worker flows among firms. Our empirical work demonstrates stark differences between gross worker and population flows which motivates taking a different approach to modeling migration.

permanent wage changes. Despite using very different methodologies we find similarly slow population adjustments.

The recent housing boom and bust has prompted a growing literature that quantifies how housing frictions impede geographical labor reallocation and leads to persistently high aggregate unemployment. For example, [Karahan and Rhee \(2012\)](#), [Lloyd-Ellis and Head \(2012\)](#) and [Nenov \(2012\)](#) study how house price collapses limit labor reallocation through disincentives to migrate arising from home ownership and local search frictions. We abstract from these factors and emphasize instead costly migration between geographically distinct labor and housing markets. [Nenov \(2012\)](#) and [Karahan and Rhee \(2012\)](#) model gross migration, but they do not address the linear relationship between gross and net migration that we find is essential to quantifying the speed of urban population adjustment.<sup>3</sup>

This paper also contributes to the literature by introducing a city’s dynamic response to an identified productivity shock as a model validation tool and by estimating the underlying stochastic process for productivity.<sup>4</sup> Model validation in the literature emphasizes unconditional cross-sectional and time-series patterns which in some cases are also used to identify model parameters. In contrast we calibrate parameters using statistics different from those we use to validate our model. Furthermore, while much of the literature relies on idiosyncratic productivity shocks to drive variation, it does not provide evidence on the nature of these shocks as we do.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>There is also an empirical literature that investigates the effects of housing-related financial frictions on mobility. See for example [Ferreira, Gyourko, and Tracy \(2011\)](#), [Modestino and Dennett \(2012\)](#) and [Schulhofer-Wohl \(2012\)](#). We abstract from financial frictions in this paper.

<sup>4</sup>[Lloyd-Ellis, Head, and Sun \(2014\)](#) estimate the responses of population, residential construction and house prices to personal income shocks identified using a panel VAR and a Choleski decomposition of the residual variance-covariance matrix.

<sup>5</sup>Exceptions are [Karahan and Rhee \(2012\)](#) who study GDP per worker for a short panel of cities and [Caliendo, Rossi-Hansberg, Parro, and Sarte \(2014\)](#) who measure state-level productivity.

## 2. Empirical Evidence

This section describes empirical evidence to motivate our analysis and guide our modeling of migration. We work with an annual panel data set covering 1985 to 2007 that includes population, net and gross migration, employment, wages, residential construction, and house prices for 365 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) comprising about 83% of the aggregate population.<sup>6</sup> We consider MSAs because they represent geographically distinct labor markets.<sup>7</sup> While sometimes comprising multiple legally incorporated cities, for convenience we refer to our MSAs as cities.

### 2.1. Gross Versus Net Migration

We use IRS data to calculate city-level net and gross migration rates because these data have wide coverage of US cities. Due to limited sample sizes gross migration rates can be calculated only for a small number of cities using other available data including the Current Population Survey and the American Community Survey. State-level migration rates can be calculated using these surveys. These data yield very similar results to those we obtain with city-level and state-level migration rates calculated using the IRS data.<sup>8</sup>

Let  $a_{it}$  and  $l_{it}$  denote the number of people flowing into and out of city  $i$  in year  $t$  and  $x_{it}$  the population of that city at the beginning of the same year. For an individual city the *arrival* (in-migration) rate is  $a_{it}/x_{it}$  and the *leaving* (out-migration) rate is  $l_{it}/x_{it}$ . The difference between the arrival and leaving rates is the net migration rate. Gross migration rates fluctuate over the business cycle and have been falling over our sample period.<sup>9</sup> To abstract from these dynamics we subtract from each city's gross

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<sup>6</sup>See [Davis, Fisher, and Veracierto \(2011\)](#) for a detailed description of these data.

<sup>7</sup>MSAs are defined as a region with a relatively high population density and close economic ties throughout as measured by commuting patterns.

<sup>8</sup>As emphasized by [Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl \(2012\)](#) there are some drawbacks to using the IRS data: tax filings under-represent the poor and elderly; addresses on tax forms are not necessarily home addresses; and tax returns may be filed late.

<sup>9</sup>See [Saks and Wozniak \(2011\)](#) for evidence on the cyclicity of gross migration and [Molloy, Smith, and Wozniak \(2011\)](#) and [Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl \(2012\)](#) for evidence of its trend.

rate in a year the corresponding cross section average in that year and define net migration as the difference between these measures.

Figure 1 contains plots of gross and net migration rates by population decile with the time effects removed. Net migration is essentially unrelated to city size. This reflects Gibrat’s law for cities, that population growth is independent of city size. However, the arrival and leaving rates are clearly diminishing in city size. This is an interesting finding worthy of further study, but its presence conflates cross-city variation with the within-city dynamics we are interested in. Therefore, after removing time fixed effects, for every city we subtract from each year’s arrival and leaving rate the time series average of the sum of the arrival and leaving rates for that city. This removes city fixed effects in gross migration without affecting net migration rates.

Figure 1: Gross and Net Migration Rates by Population Decile





Figure 2 displays mean arrival and leaving rates against mean net migration for each net migration decile, after removing both time and city fixed effects and adding back the corresponding unconditional mean to the gross migration rates. Notice first that gross migration is large and far exceeds the amount necessary to account for net migration. For example, in a city with zero net migration an average of 11% of the

Figure 2: Gross Migration Rates by Net Migration



population either arrives to or leaves from a city during a year.

Second, the arrival rate is monotonically increasing and the leaving rate is monotonically decreasing in net migration. This suggests it is important to model both gross migration margins in order to understand urban population dynamics. The rising arrival rate as a function of net migration is *prima facie* evidence that migration involves a directed component. Otherwise gross arrivals would be independent of net migration. The negative relationship between the arrival and leaving rates appears to be inconsistent with [Coen-Pirani \(2010\)](#)'s finding of a positive correlation between the two gross migration rates at the state level. The difference arises from our removal of city fixed effects from the gross migration rates.<sup>10</sup>

Third, and most striking, the gross migration rates fall almost exactly on the corresponding regression lines.<sup>11</sup> This finding sharply contrasts with what we observe for worker flows. In particular, [Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger \(2006\)](#) find that

<sup>10</sup>[Coen-Pirani \(2010\)](#) removes cross-sectional variation in the occupational characteristics of states prior to his analysis.

<sup>11</sup>We obtain virtually identical regression lines when we use all the data rather than first taking averages of deciles and when we estimate using data from the first 5 years of the sample and the last five years of the sample. We also find qualitatively similar results when we regress gross on net migration separately for each city in our sample.

hires are flat and close to zero for negative net flows and linearly increasing in net flows otherwise; separations are essentially the mirror image. These differences suggest models designed to explain firm worker flows are not suitable for understanding city population flows – we require a different theory.

## 2.2. Responses of Population and Gross Migration to TFP Shocks

We estimate dynamic responses of city-level variables to local productivity shocks by exploiting the first order conditions of final and intermediate good producers in the quantitative model described in Section 4. These conditions are used to obtain a measure of total factor productivity (TFP) using data on wages and employment from which we estimate a stochastic process for its growth. We estimate the dynamic response of a variable to TFP shocks by regressing it on current and lagged values of the innovations derived from the estimated TFP growth process.

There are  $N$  cities that each produce a distinct intermediate good used as an input into the production of final goods. The production function for a representative firm producing intermediate goods in city  $i$  at date  $t$  is

$$y_{it} = s_{it} n_{y,it}^\theta k_{y,it}^\gamma, \quad (1)$$

where  $s_{it}$  is exogenous TFP for the city,  $n_{y,it}$  is employment,  $k_{y,it}$  is equipment,  $\theta > 0$ ,  $\gamma > 0$ , and  $\theta + \gamma \leq 1$ . The output of the final good at date  $t$ ,  $Y_t$  is produced using inputs of city-specific intermediate goods according to

$$Y_t = \left[ \sum_{i=1}^N y_{it}^\chi \right]^{\frac{1}{\chi}}, \quad (2)$$

where  $\chi \leq 1$ .

Our measurement of city-specific TFP relies on the following definition. For any

variable  $v_{it}$ :

$$\hat{v}_{it} \equiv \ln v_{it} - \frac{1}{N} \sum_{j=1}^N \ln v_{jt}. \quad (3)$$

Subtracting the mean value of  $\ln v_{jt}$  in each period eliminates variation due to aggregate shocks, allowing us to focus on within-city dynamics. Under the assumption of perfectly mobile equipment the rental rate of equipment is common to all cities. It then follows from the first order conditions of competitive final and intermediate good producers that

$$\Delta \hat{s}_{it} = \frac{1 - \gamma\chi}{\chi} \Delta \hat{w}_{it} + \frac{1 - \theta\chi - \gamma\chi}{\chi} \Delta \hat{n}_{y,it}, \quad (4)$$

where  $\Delta$  is the first difference operator and  $w_i$  denotes the wage in city  $i$ . Applying the first difference operator addresses non-stationarity over the sample period.<sup>12</sup>

Given values for  $\chi$ ,  $\theta$  and  $\gamma$  and data on wages and employment equation (4) can be used to measure  $\Delta \hat{s}_{it}$ , the growth rate of city-specific TFP.<sup>13</sup> Below we calibrate  $\theta$  and  $\gamma$  using traditional methods and find a value for  $\chi$  to match the model to Zipf's law. With calibrated values  $\chi = 0.9$ ,  $\theta = 0.66$  and  $\gamma = 0.235$  we estimate an AR(1) in  $\Delta \hat{s}_{it}$  with a statistically significant auto-correlation coefficient equal to 0.24 and standard deviation of the error term equal to 0.015. [Wooldridge \(2002\)](#)'s test of the null hypothesis of no first order serial correlation in the residuals yields a p-value of 0.28, which confirms that this specification is a good fit for the data.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup>First differencing removes fixed effects if they are present in the data and so our empirical analysis is robust to them. However, as in [Gabaix \(1999\)](#), our quantitative model addresses the cross-section of city populations without appealing to fixed effects.

<sup>13</sup>We use total employment to measure  $n_{y,it}$ . In our quantitative model total employment includes workers in the residential construction and intermediate good sectors. Residential construction employment data are not available, but for some cities total construction employment data are. When we redo our empirical analysis subtracting construction employment from the total we obtain almost identical results because construction is a small fraction of total employment. We measure TFP in the same way in the data and the model, with one exception pointed out below.


<sup>14</sup>It is straightforward to modify equation (4) to include agglomeration as in [Davis, Fisher, and Whited \(2014\)](#) and it leads to the same measurement equation for the exogenous component of TFP except that the coefficients on wage and employment growth include a parameter governing the effect of agglomeration on local productivity. When we re-estimate the TFP process using [Davis et al. \(2014\)](#)'s estimate of this parameter we find the serial correlation coefficient and the innovation

We now show how to use the estimated TFP process to identify the dynamic responses of variables to exogenous local TFP shocks. Let  $e_{it}$  denote the residual from the estimated TFP growth auto-regression. Then, we estimate the dynamic response to a TFP shock of variable  $\Delta\hat{x}_{it}$  as the coefficients  $b_0, b_1, \dots, b_4$  from the following panel regression:

$$\Delta\hat{x}_{it} = \sum_{l=0}^4 b_l e_{it-l} + u_{it} \quad (5)$$

where  $u_{it}$  is an error term which is orthogonal to the other right-hand-side variables under the maintained hypothesis that the process for TFP growth is correctly specified. The dynamic response of  $\hat{x}_{it}$  is obtained by summing the estimated coefficients appropriately. For the gross migration rates we replace  $\Delta\hat{x}_{it}$  with the rates themselves (transformed as described above) in (5) and identify the dynamic responses with the estimated coefficients directly.


Figure 3: Responses of TFP and Population



Note: Point estimates along with 2 standard error bands.

Figure 3 displays the percentage point deviation responses of TFP and population to a 1 standard deviation impulse to TFP. This plot establishes the claim made in the introduction that TFP responds much like a random walk, rising quickly to its standard deviation are only a little different.

Figure 4: Responses of Arrival and Leaving Rates



Note: Point estimates along with 2 standard error bands.

new long run level, and that population responds far more slowly. Figure 4 shows that the adjustment of population occurs along both the arrival and leaving margins, as suggested by our earlier discussion of Figure 2. On impact the arrival rate jumps up and the leaving rate jumps down and then both slowly return toward their long run levels. The indicated sampling uncertainty suggests that the arrival and leaving margins are about equally important for population adjustments to TFP shocks. Evidently improving local prospects influence population dynamics both by encouraging workers not to move and by attracting new workers to the city.

### 3. Modeling Migration

We now introduce our theory of migration by studying a simple, static model which abstracts from housing, equipment, and labor supply. This simplified model is used to develop intuition about migration choices; to describe how and why we can reproduce the relationships depicted in Figure 2; and to establish that modeling gross migration is essential to understanding urban population dynamics. The main results extend

to our quantitative model.<sup>15</sup>

### 3.1. A Static Model

The economy consists of a large number of geographically distinct cities with initial population  $x$ . In each city there are firms which produce identical, freely tradeable consumption goods with the technology  $sn^\theta$ , where  $s$  is a city-wide TFP shock,  $n$  is labor and  $0 < \theta < 1$ . There is a representative household with a unit continuum of members that are distributed across city types  $z = (s, x)$  according to the measure  $\mu$ . Each household member enjoys consumption,  $C$ , and supplies a unit of labor inelastically. After the TFP shocks have been realized, but before production takes place, the household decides how many of its members leave each city and how many of those chosen to leave move to each city. Once these migration decisions have been made, production and consumption occur.

The leaving decision is based on each household member receiving a *location-taste* shock  $\psi$ , with measure  $\mu_l$ , that subtracts from their utility of staying in the city in which they are initially located. This kind of shock is used by KW in their measurement of migration costs as well as by [Karahan and Rhee \(2012\)](#) and [Nenov \(2012\)](#). To match the empirical relationship between gross and net migration we make a parametric assumption on the distribution of individual location-taste shocks in a city of type  $z$ :

$$\int_{-\infty}^{\bar{\psi}(l(z)/x)} \psi d\mu_l = -\psi_1 \frac{l(z)}{x} + \frac{\psi_2}{2} \left( \frac{l(z)}{x} \right)^2$$

where the parameters  $\psi_1$  and  $\psi_2$  are both non-negative and  $\bar{\psi}(l(z)/x)$  is defined by

$$\frac{l(z)}{x} = \int_{-\infty}^{\bar{\psi}(l(z)/x)} d\mu_l.$$

This parameterization is U-shaped starting at the origin meaning that the first

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<sup>15</sup>See the technical appendix available at <http://morris.marginalq.com/research.html> for a detailed analysis of the static and quantitative models.

workers to leave a city are those for whom leaving raises their utility. As more people leave the remaining inhabitants are those who have a strong preference for staying. These features are consistent with KW's evidence that individuals who move receive substantial non-pecuniary benefits and that non-movers would find it extremely costly if they were forced to move. For example, many individuals move to be near family members or find it very costly to move because they are already near family members. Subject to these shocks, the household determines how many of its members from each city must find new cities. Household members chosen to find new cities are called *leavers*.

When deciding where to send its leavers the household knows the distribution of city types  $\mu$  but not the location of any specific type  $z$ . However, it can find a particular type through *directed migration* by obtaining a *guided trip*. We choose a functional form for producing guided trips to match the evidence on gross and net migration. By giving up  $u$  units of utility each household member can produce  $\sqrt{2}A^{-1/2}u^{1/2}$ ,  $A \geq 0$ , guided trips to her initial location. Therefore, to attract  $a(z)$  workers to a city of the indicated type the household must incur a total utility cost of  $(A/2)(a(z)/x)^2 x$ . Guided trips encompass the many ways workers find new cities to live and work, including via informal contacts between friends and family, professional networks, specialized firms like head-hunters, advertising that promotes cities as desirable places to live and work, firms' human resource departments, and via recruiting by workers whose primary responsibility is some other productive activity.

If a household member does not obtain a guided trip it can migrate to another city using *undirected migration*. Specifically, by incurring a utility cost  $\tau$  a leaver is randomly allocated to another city in proportion to its initial population. Including undirected migration captures the idea that choosing to move to a particular city is often the outcome of idiosyncratic factors other than wages or housing costs that are difficult to model explicitly, such as attractiveness of amenities and proximity to family members.<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, it is natural to let people move to a location without

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<sup>16</sup>KW include both undirected and directed migration. It is undirected because to learn a loca-

forcing them to find someone to guide them.

We characterize allocations in this economy by solving the following planning problem:

$$\max_{\{C, \Lambda, a(z), l(z), p(z)\}} \left\{ \ln C - \int \left[ \frac{A}{2} \left( \frac{a(z)}{x} \right)^2 x + \left( -\psi_1 \frac{l(z)}{x} + \frac{\psi_2}{2} \left( \frac{l(z)}{x} \right)^2 \right) x \right] d\mu - \tau \Lambda \right\} \quad (6)$$

subject to

$$p(z) \leq x + a(z) + \Lambda x - l(z), \forall z \quad (7)$$

$$\int [a(z) + \Lambda x] d\mu \leq \int l(z) d\mu \quad (8)$$

$$C \leq \int sp(z)^\theta d\mu \quad (9)$$

and non-negativity constraints on the choice variables.<sup>17</sup> The variable  $\Lambda$  is the fraction of the household that engages in undirected migration. Since these workers are allocated to cities in proportion to their initial populations,  $\Lambda$  also corresponds to the share of a city's initial population that arrives through undirected migration. Constraint (7) states that population in a city is no greater than the initial population plus arrivals through guided trips and undirected migration minus the number of workers who migrate out of the city. Constraint (8) says that total arrivals can be no greater than the total number of workers who migrate out of cities and (9) restricts consumption to be no greater than total production, taking into account that each individual supplies a unit of labor inelastically,  $n(z) = p(z)$ ,  $\forall z$ .

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tion's permanent component of wages workers have to migrate there. It is directed because workers retain information about locations to which they have previously migrated and include this information in their current migration decision along with expectations about locations they have not visited already.

<sup>17</sup>See Appendix B for one possible decentralization.

### 3.2. The Importance of Both Gross Migration Margins

It is necessary to include frictions on both gross migration margins to match the evidence depicted in Figure 2. Suppose  $A = 0$  so that guided trips can be produced at no cost, but that household members continue to be subject to location-taste shocks,  $\psi_1 > 0$  and  $\psi_2 > 0$ . Then it is straightforward to show

$$\frac{a(z)}{x} = \max \left\{ \frac{p(z)-x}{x} + \frac{\psi_1}{\psi_2}, 0 \right\}; \quad \frac{l(z)}{x} = \max \left\{ \frac{\psi_1}{\psi_2}, - \left( \frac{p(z)-x}{x} \right) \right\}.$$

Observe that as long as the net population growth rate,  $(p(z) - x)/x$ , is not too negative, the planner sets the leaving rate,  $l(z)/x$  at the point of maximum benefits,  $\psi_1/\psi_2$ , and adjusts population using the arrival rate,  $a(z)/x$ , only. In this situation the leaving rate is independent of net population adjustments, contradicting Figure 2.

Now suppose that there are no location-taste shocks,  $\psi_1 = \psi_2 = 0$ , but it is costly to create guided trips,  $A > 0$ . In this case we find

$$\frac{l(z)}{x} = \max \left\{ - \left( \frac{p(z)-x}{x} - \Lambda \right), 0 \right\}; \quad \frac{a(z)}{x} = \max \left\{ \frac{p(z)-x}{x} - \Lambda, 0 \right\}.$$

Without taste shocks the planner always goes to a corner: when net population growth is positive the leaving rate is set to zero, and when net population growth is negative the arrival rate is set to zero. Clearly the relationship between gross and net migration in this situation also contradicts Figure 2. We conclude that to be consistent with the relationship between gross and net migration, it is necessary to include frictions on both gross migration margins.

### 3.3. Migration Trade-offs

Now we use the planner's first order conditions to illustrate the trade-offs involved in allocating workers across cities. To begin we note that for the model to be consistent with Figure 2, the number of workers leaving a city and the number arriving to the

same city using guided trips must both be strictly positive,  $l(z) > 0$  and  $a(z) > 0$ . The reason we require  $l(z) > 0$  is that gross out-migration is always positive in Figure 2. The reason we require  $a(z) > 0$  is that otherwise there would be intervals of net migration in which arrival rates are constant, equal to  $\Lambda$ , which is also inconsistent with Figure 2. Therefore, unless otherwise noted, from now on we assume that  $a(z) > 0$  and  $l(z) > 0$ .

Combining the first order conditions for  $\Lambda$  and  $a(z)$  we obtain

$$\tau = \int Aa(z) d\mu.$$

This equation describes the trade-off between using directed and undirected migration. The marginal cost of raising the fraction of household members engaged in undirected migration is equated to the average marginal cost of allocating those household members using guided trips. The averaging reflects the fact that undirected migration allocates workers in proportion to each city's initial population. The first order conditions for  $a(z)$  and  $l(z)$  imply that

$$A \frac{a(z)}{x} = \psi_1 - \psi_2 \frac{l(z)}{x}.$$

Intuitively, migration out of a city increases to the point where the marginal benefits of doing so (recall that the location-taste shocks initially imply benefits to leaving a city) are equated with the marginal cost of attracting workers into the city.

### 3.4. Connecting Figure 2 to Population Adjustments

The planner's first order conditions reveal how gross migration relates to net migration. From the first order conditions for  $a(z)$  and  $l(z)$  and the population constraint, (7), it is straightforward to show that

$$\frac{a(z)}{x} + \Lambda = \frac{\psi_1}{A + \psi_2} + \frac{A}{A + \psi_2} \Lambda + \frac{\psi_2}{A + \psi_2} \left( \frac{p(z) - x}{x} \right). \quad (10)$$

The arrival rate is an affine function of the net migration rate  $(p(z) - x)/x$  with the linear coefficient satisfying  $0 < \psi_2/(\psi_2 + A) < 1$ . Similarly the leaving rate is given by:

$$\frac{l(z)}{x} = \frac{\psi_1}{A + \psi_2} + \frac{A}{A + \psi_2}\Lambda - \frac{A}{A + \psi_2} \left( \frac{p(z) - x}{x} \right). \quad (11)$$

The leaving rate is also an affine function of the net migration rate with the linear coefficient satisfying  $-1 < -A/(\psi_2 + A) < 0$ . Equations (10) and (11) establish that gross migration in the model can be made consistent with Figure 2. This result is the underlying reason for our specifications of the location-taste shocks and the production of guided trips. Clearly, the relationship between gross and net migration depicted in Figure 2 places strong restrictions on the nature of migration frictions.

Modeling both gross migration margins also plays a crucial role in measuring the speed of population adjustments. This can be seen by substituting for  $a(z)$  and  $l(z)$  in the original planning problem using (10) and (11), which simplifies it to

$$\max_{\{p(z), \Lambda\}} \left\{ \ln \left( \int sp(z)^\theta d\mu \right) - \int \left[ \Phi(\Lambda) + \frac{1}{2} \frac{A\psi_2}{A + \psi_2} \left( \frac{p(z) - x}{x} \right)^2 x \right] d\mu - \tau\Lambda \right\}$$

subject to:

$$\int p(z) d\mu = \int x d\mu \quad (12)$$

with non-negativity constraints on the choice variables and where  $\Phi(\Lambda)$  is a quadratic function in  $\Lambda$  involving the underlying structural parameters  $\psi_1, \psi_2$  and  $A$ . In deriving this simplified planning problem we have used the fact that (7) and (8) reduce to (12) and that this constraint holds with equality at the optimum. Similarly we have used (9) to substitute for consumption in the planner's objective function.

When the planning problem is written in this way we see that population adjustments do not depend directly on  $a(z)$  and  $l(z)$ . Nevertheless modeling these decisions is crucial for understanding population dynamics because the coefficient that

determines the speed of population's adjustment to shocks,  $A\psi_2/(A + \psi_2)$ , involves parameters governing them. Also notice that the reduced form costs of adjusting population are quadratic. This is a direct consequence of specifying the location-taste shocks and guided trip production function to reproduce Figure 2. In other words Figure 2 implies quadratic adjustment costs in net population adjustments.

Finally, notice that as long as  $a(z) > 0$  and  $l(z) > 0$ , assumed in the statement of the simplified planning problem, population adjustments are independent of the undirected migration decision. Undirected migration is determined by the solution to

$$\tau = \frac{d\Phi(\Lambda)}{d\Lambda}.$$

Therefore when arrivals are always strictly positive undirected migration plays no role in net population adjustments. In the more general quantitative model arrivals are set to zero in especially undesirable cities. Still, for most cases arrivals are strictly positive so that undirected migration is essentially irrelevant for our results. This is a useful property given that there is little evidence on the magnitude of undirected migration in the data. Nevertheless we include it because, as noted previously, otherwise workers could only move by obtaining a guided trip and we think this is implausible.

#### 4. The Quantitative Model

This section describes the model we use to quantify the influence of gross migration and housing on urban population dynamics. We employ a differentiated goods version of the neoclassical growth model that incorporates the gross migration cost structure described in the previous section as well as local residential construction. In principle, both elements could play an important role shaping population dynamics. The role of gross migration was explained in detail in the previous section, but the potential role of housing is more straightforward: since housing is valued by individuals, adjustment costs in the residential sector are likely to be reflected in population adjustments.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>This point is demonstrated in Appendix C

A key goal of the paper is to evaluate the relative influence of both channels. To enhance the credibility of the evaluation the model also incorporates a labor supply decision because changes in labor supply are a natural alternative to migration for a city to adjust to labor demand shocks. After describing the model environment we characterize its unique stationary competitive equilibrium as the solution to a representative city planning problem with side conditions.

#### 4.1. The Environment

As before the economy consists of a continuum of geographically distinct locations called cities that are subject to idiosyncratic TFP shocks. Cities are distinguished by their stock of housing,  $h$ , initial population,  $x$ , and the current and lagged TFP,  $s$  and  $s_{-1}$ . The measure over the state vector  $z = (h, x, s, s_{-1})$  is given by  $\mu$ .

Within cities there are three production sectors corresponding to intermediate goods, housing services and construction. The representative firm of each sector maximizes profits taking prices as given. Intermediate goods are distinct to a city and imperfectly substitutable in the production of the freely tradeable final goods non-durable consumption and durable equipment. The technologies for producing intermediate and final goods are identical to those underlying our estimates of TFP, described in equations (1) and (2).<sup>19</sup> Housing services are produced by combining residential structures with land,  $b_r$ , according to  $h^{1-\zeta}b_r^\zeta$ ,  $0 < \zeta < 1$ . Following the convention that the prime symbol denotes next period's value of a variable, residential structures in a city evolve as

$$h' = (1 - \delta_h) h + n_h^\alpha k_h^\vartheta b_h^{1-\alpha-\vartheta}, \quad (13)$$

where the factor shares are restricted to  $\alpha > 0$ ,  $\vartheta > 0$  and  $\alpha + \vartheta < 1$ , and  $0 < \delta_h < 1$  denotes housing's depreciation rate. The last term in (13) represents housing con-

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<sup>19</sup>Equations (1) and (2) are written in terms of the location of a city, indexed by  $i$ , but here it is convenient to index them by the type of the city as represented by its state vector  $z$ .

struction. Local TFP  $s$  does not impact residential construction, reflecting our view that residential construction productivity is not a major source of cross-city variation in TFP. Equation (13) embodies our assumptions that residential structures are immobile, durable and costly to build quickly. The latter follows because residential construction requires local labor and land which have alternative uses in intermediate goods production and housing services. We assume that equipment used in production and construction is homogenous.

There is an infinitely lived representative household that allocates its unit continuum of members across the cities. The household faces the same migration choices described in Section 3, but being infinitely lived it takes into account the effects of current migration decisions on its members' allocation across cities in future periods. In particular, it is now bound by the constraint

$$x' = p \tag{14}$$

in each city where  $p$  continues to denote the post-migration population of a city. The household's members have logarithmic preferences for consumption and housing services in the city in which they are located.<sup>20</sup> They also face a non-trivial labor supply decision. We assume that each period, after the migration decisions have been made, but before production and construction take place, individual household members receive a labor disutility shock  $\varphi$  with measure  $\mu_n$ . Similar to our treatment of migration costs we make a parametric assumption for the average disutility of working. Specifically, if the household decides  $n$  of its members in a city will work for a year these costs are specified as

$$\int_{-\infty}^{\bar{\varphi}(n/p)} \varphi d\mu_n = \phi \left( \frac{n}{p} \right)^\pi,$$

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<sup>20</sup>We assume logarithmic preferences for housing because they imply housing's share in household expenditures is constant across cities, which is consistent with evidence reported by [Davis and Ortalo-Magné \(2011\)](#).

where  $\phi > 0$ ,  $\pi \geq 1$  and  $\bar{\varphi}(n/p)$  is defined by

$$\frac{n}{p} = \int_0^{\bar{\varphi}(n/p)} d\mu_n.$$

The parameter  $\pi$  governs the elasticity of a city's labor supply with respect to the local wage.

## 4.2. Stationary Competitive Equilibrium

This model has a unique stationary competitive equilibrium. Since it is a convex economy with no distortions, the welfare theorems apply and so the equilibrium allocation can be obtained by solving the problem of a planner that maximizes the expected utility of the representative household subject to the resource feasibility constraints. However, it is more convenient to characterize the equilibrium allocation as the solution to a representative city planner's problem with side conditions. This approach to studying equilibrium allocation follows [Alvarez and Shimer \(2011\)](#) and [Alvarez and Veracierto \(2012\)](#).

The city planner enters a period with the state vector  $z$ . Taking as given aggregate output of final goods,  $Y$ , the marginal utility of consumption,  $\lambda$ , the shadow value of adding one individual to the city's population exclusive of the arrival and leaving costs,  $\lambda\eta$ , the shadow value of equipment,  $\lambda r_k$ , the arrival rate of workers through undirected migration  $\Lambda$ , and the transition function for TFP,  $Q(s'; s, s_{-1})$ , the representative city planner solves

$$V(z) = \max_{\substack{\{n_y, n_h, k_y, k_h, \\ h', b_r, b_h, p, a, l\}}} \left\{ \lambda \frac{1}{\chi} Y^{1-\chi} [s n_y^\theta k_y^\gamma]^\chi + H \ln \left( \frac{h^{1-\zeta} b_r^\zeta}{p} \right) p - \phi (n_y + n_h)^\pi p^{1-\pi} \right. \\ \left. - \lambda r_k (k_y + k_h) - \lambda \eta (a + \Lambda x - l) \right. \\ \left. - \frac{A}{2} \left( \frac{a}{x} \right)^2 x - \left[ -\psi_1 \frac{l}{x} + \frac{\psi_2}{2} \left( \frac{l}{x} \right)^2 \right] x + \beta \int V(z') dQ(s'; s, s_{-1}) \right\}$$

subject to

$$\begin{aligned}
 p &= x + a + \Lambda x - l & (15) \\
 n_y + n_h &\leq p \\
 b_r + b_h &= 1
 \end{aligned}$$

plus (13), (14), and non-negativity constraints on the choice variables.

The planner's objective is to maximize the expected present discounted value of net local surplus. To see this note that the first two terms are the value of intermediate good production and the housing services consumed in the city. The next five terms comprise the contemporaneous costs to the planner of obtaining this surplus: the disutility of sending the indicated number of people to work; the shadow cost of equipment used in the city; and the disutility of net migration inclusive of guided trip production and location-taste shocks. The last term is the discounted continuation value given the updated state vector. Constraining the achievement of the city planner's objective are the local resource constraints, the housing and population transition equations and the non-negativity constraints on the choice variables. Note that in the statement of the land constraint we have normalized the local endowment of residential land to unity and used the fact that land used for current housing services cannot be built on in the same period.<sup>21</sup>

Let  $\lambda\xi(z)$  denote the Lagrange multiplier corresponding to constraint (15) in the city planner's problem. This function represents the shadow value of bringing an additional individual to a type- $z$  city. From the first order conditions of the city

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<sup>21</sup>In our calibration  $0 < \theta + \gamma < 1$  which implies the presence of a fixed factor in the production of the intermediate good. As written the production function assumes that the supply of this fixed factor is constant (equal to one) across cities. One interpretation of this fixed factor is that it represents commercial land. Under this interpretation commercial land cannot be converted into residential land and vice versa.

planner's problem it is easy to show that

$$\lambda\xi(z) = \begin{cases} A \left[ \frac{a(z)}{x} \right] + \lambda\eta, & \text{if } a(z) > 0, \\ \left[ \psi_1 - \psi_2 \left( \frac{l(z)}{x} \right) \right] + \lambda\eta, & \text{if } l(z) > 0. \end{cases} \quad (16)$$

which assumes that  $a(z) = l(z) = 0$  will never occur in equilibrium. Comparing equation (16) to the first order conditions for  $a(z)$  and  $l(z)$  in the static model of Section 3 we see that if gross migration rates are positive then the shadow value of a migrant is related to migration costs in the same way.

The unique stationary allocation is the solution to the city planner's problem that satisfies particular side conditions we now describe. Let  $\{n_y, n_h, k_y, k_h, h', b_r, b_h, p, a, l\}$  denote the optimal decision rules (which are functions of the state  $z$ ) for the city planner's problem that takes  $\{Y, \lambda, \eta, r_k, \Lambda\}$  as given and  $\mu$  be the invariant distribution generated by the optimal decision rules  $\{h', p\}$  and the transition function  $Q$ . In addition define the aggregate stock of equipment and per capita consumption:

$$\begin{aligned} K &= \int (k_y + k_h) d\mu; \\ C &= Y - \delta_k K, \end{aligned}$$

where  $0 < \delta_k < 1$  denotes equipment's depreciation rate. Now suppose the following equations are satisfied

$$Y = \left\{ \int \left[ s n_y(z)^\theta k_y(z)^\gamma \right]^x d\mu \right\}^{\frac{1}{x}} \quad (17)$$

$$\lambda = \frac{1}{C} \quad (18)$$

$$\int a(z) d\mu + \Lambda = \int l(z) d\mu \quad (19)$$

$$r_k = \frac{1}{\beta} - 1 + \delta_k \quad (20)$$

$$\lambda \int [\xi(z) - \eta] x d\mu - \tau \leq 0, (= 0 \text{ if } \Lambda > 0) \quad (21)$$

Then  $\{C, K, n_y, n_h, k_y, k_h, h', b_r, b_h, p, \Lambda, a, l\}$  is a steady state allocation.<sup>22</sup>

In the steady state the variables taken as given in the city planner's problem solve the side conditions given by (17)–(21). Equation (17) expresses aggregate output in terms of intermediate good production in each city. This equation is the theoretical counterpart to equation (2) used to estimate city-specific TFP. The marginal utility of consumption is given by equation (18). Equation (19) states that total in-migration equals total out-migration. Equation (20) defines the rental rate for equipment. The last side condition (21) determines steady state undirected migration. It turns out to be identical to the first order condition for  $\Lambda$  in the static model.

The function  $\xi(z)$  in (21) represents the value to the city planner of bringing an additional individual to the city. It is central to the determination of migration in the model and can be shown to satisfy

$$\begin{aligned} \xi(z) = & C\phi [n_y(z) + n_h(z)]^\pi (\pi - 1) p(z)^{-\pi} + CH \ln \left( \frac{h(z)^\varsigma b_r(z)^{1-\varsigma}}{p(z)} \right) - CH \\ & + \beta \int \left( CA \left[ \frac{a(z')}{p(z)} \right]^2 + C\psi_2 \left[ \frac{l(z')}{p(z)} \right]^2 + \Lambda [\xi(z') - \eta] + \xi(z') \right) dQ(s'; s, s_{-1}). \end{aligned} \quad (22)$$

The value of bringing an additional worker to a city comprises four terms: the benefits of obtaining a better selection of worker disutilities given the same amount of total employment  $n_y + n_h$ ; the benefits of the local housing services that the additional person will enjoy; the costs of reducing housing services for everybody else; and the expected discounted value of starting the following period with an additional person. This last term includes the benefits of having an additional person producing guided trips to the city, the benefits of obtaining a better selection of location-taste shocks, and the benefits of attracting additional people to the city through undirected migration.

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<sup>22</sup>See the online technical appendix for a proof of this claim. We describe how we solve the model in Appendix E.

When there are no migration frictions,  $A = \psi_1 = \psi_2 = 0$ , equation (16) implies that the marginal value of bringing an additional individual to a city is equated across cities,  $\xi(z) = \eta, \forall z$ . However, this does not imply that wages are equated across cities. Instead, equation (22) says that the marginal savings in worker disutility plus the marginal impact on the utility of housing services is equated. When in addition to  $A = \psi_1 = \psi_2 = 0$  housing structures are made perfectly mobile across cities, the same condition is obtained because land remains immobile. Finally, when land is also made mobile, then the marginal savings in work disutility and the marginal utility of housing services are each equated across cities.

## 5. Calibration

We now calibrate the steady state competitive equilibrium to U.S. data.<sup>23</sup> Our calibration has two important characteristics. First, the city-specific TFP process is chosen to match our estimates presented in Section 2.2 thereby pinning down the model's exogenous source of persistence and volatility. Second, the calibration targets for the remaining parameters involve features of the data that are not primary to our study. So, for instance, we do not choose parameters to fit our estimated response of population to a TFP shock. The model's response of population to a TFP shock is the consequence of the estimated TFP process and the remaining parameters that are chosen to fit other features of the data.

In addition to specifying the stochastic process for TFP we need to find values for 16 parameters:

$$\theta, \gamma, \alpha, \vartheta, \delta_k, \delta_h, \beta, H, \zeta, \pi, \phi, \psi_1, \psi_2, A, \tau, \chi.$$

These include the factor shares in production and construction, depreciation rates for equipment and structures, the discount factor, the housing coefficient in preferences, land's share in housing services, and the parameters governing labor supply,

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<sup>23</sup>Except where noted the aggregate data used to calibrate our model is obtained from Haver Analytics.

migration, and intermediate goods' substitutability.

We calibrate these parameters conditional on a given quantity of undirected migration  $\Lambda$  determined by  $\tau$ . For larger values of  $\tau$  undirected migration is relatively small so that  $a(z) > 0, \forall z$ . In these cases the behavior of the model is invariant to the specific value of  $\tau$ . For smaller values of  $\tau$  undirected migration is large and  $a(z) = 0$  for some  $z$ . In these cases the behavior of the model is affected. It turns out that even for seemingly large steady state  $\Lambda$  corner solutions for  $a(z)$  are either non-existent or extremely rare. We set our baseline so that the undirected arrival rate is 3.8%, roughly 70% of all moves.<sup>24</sup>

The baseline calibration for the assumed value of  $\tau$  is summarized in Table 1. There we indicate for each parameter the proximate calibration target, the actual value for the target we obtain in the baseline calibration, and the resulting parameter value. In the remainder of this section we discuss the calculations underlying Table 1. We begin with the novel aspects of our calibration which involve the parameters governing migration, the city-level TFP process, the elasticity of substitution of intermediate goods, and labor supply.

## 5.1. Migration Parameters

Section 3.4 establishes that the migration parameters  $A$ ,  $\psi_1$  and  $\psi_2$  are central to determining the speed of population's adjustment to TFP shocks in the model. Fortunately there is evidence at hand that makes assigning values to these parameters straightforward. First, conditional on a value for  $A$  reproducing reproducing Figure 2 pins down  $\psi_1$  and  $\psi_2$  via equation (10).<sup>25</sup> In particular

$$\frac{\psi_1}{A+\psi_2} + \frac{A}{A+\psi_2}\Lambda = 5.5; \quad \frac{\psi_2}{A+\psi_2} = 0.57.$$

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<sup>24</sup>The specific value is  $\tau = 1$ . For this value the baseline calibration has 0.3% of city-year observations involving zero arrivals.

<sup>25</sup>The constant term for arrivals in Figure 2 is the sample average gross migration rate, but gross migration is declining over our sample. We examined the implications of calibrating to the average gross migration rate at the start and end of our sample and found that our results are substantively the same.

Table 1: Baseline Calibration

Parameter	Parameter Description	Calibration Target	Target Value	Actual Value	Parameter Value
$\theta$	Labor's share in intermediate goods	$\int w [n_y + n_h] d\mu / GDP$	0.64	0.64	0.66
$\alpha$	Labor's share in construction	$\int n_h d\mu / \int [n_y + n_h] d\mu$	0.042	0.042	0.41
$\beta$	Discount factor	Real interest rate	0.04	0.04	0.9615
$\gamma$	Intermediate goods' equipment share	$K_y / GDP$	1.53	1.53	0.235
$\delta_k$	Depreciation rate of equipment	$\delta_k K / GDP$	0.16	0.16	0.104
$\vartheta$	Equipment's share in construction	$K_h / GDP$	0.022	0.022	0.05
$\delta_h$	Depreciation rate of structures	$I / GDP$	0.064	0.064	0.045
$\zeta$	Land's share in housing services	$\int q^b b_r d\mu / [\int q^b h d\mu + \int q^b b_r d\mu]$	0.37	0.36	0.215
$H$	Housing coefficient in preferences	$\int q^b h d\mu / GDP$	1.55	1.50	0.205
$\phi$	Labor disutility	$\int [n_y + n_h] d\mu / \int p d\mu$	0.63	0.63	1.61
$\pi$	Labor supply elasticity	$\partial \ln [n_y + n_h / p] / \partial \ln w$	0.24	0.25	5.0
$\psi_1$	Taste shock slope	Mean arrivals	5.5	5.5	6.12
$\psi_2$	Taste shock curvature	Slope of arrivals versus net	0.57	0.57	44.4
$A$	Guided trip cost	Average moving costs/average wages	-1.9	-1.9	33.5
$\chi$	Intermediate goods' complementarity	Zipf's law for population	-1.0	-1.3	0.9
$g$	Drift in technology	Zipf's law for TFP	-3.5	-3.4	-0.0017
$\rho$	TFP lag coefficient	Serial corr. of TFP growth	0.24	0.22	0.35
$\sigma$	TFP innovation std. err.	TFP growth innovation std. err.	0.015	0.015	0.019

Note: The calibration is based on  $\tau = 1$ . See the text for details. The actual values for the serial correlation and innovation of TFP growth are based on simulations. The underlying parameter values for the TFP process are somewhat different because of the discrete approximation we use.

To identify  $A$  we take advantage of KW’s estimate of the average net cost of migration for those who move. Specifically, we match the statistic defined as the average net cost of migration of those who move divided by average wages where we take the latter from KW as well.<sup>26</sup> It is straightforward to replicate their concept of moving costs in our model. In KW, net moving costs sum two components of the utility flow of an individual in the period of a move. One component called “deterministic moving costs” is a function of the distance of the move, whether the move is to a location previously visited or not, the age of the mover, and the size of the destination location. The second component is the difference between idiosyncratic benefits in the current and destination location. We interpret the cost of guided trips and undirected migration as representing the first component and the location-taste shocks the second one. Consequently we measure average moving costs of individuals who move as

$$\frac{\int q(z)a(z) d\mu + C\tau\Lambda}{\int a(z) d\mu + \Lambda} + \frac{C \int \left( -\psi_1 \frac{l(z)}{x} + \psi_2 \left( \frac{l(z)}{x} \right)^2 \right) x d\mu}{\int l(z) d\mu},$$

where  $q(z)$  is the price of a guided trip in the decentralization discussed in Appendix B. Average wages are simply

$$\frac{\int w(z) [n_y(z) + n_h(z)] d\mu}{\int [n_y(z) + n_h(z)] d\mu},$$

where wages in a type- $z$  city,  $w(z)$ , equal the marginal product of labor.

There are two potential drawbacks to using KW’s estimate of moving costs. First, KW identify moving costs using individual-level data. Since an individual’s choice of location is not determined in the model we cannot replicate their estimation strategy. Still, our model implies a value for KW’s moving cost statistic so it is natural to take

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<sup>26</sup>Using KW’s estimates, average net moving costs of those who move divided by average annual wages equal -1.9. This value equals the ratio  $-\$80,768/\$42,850$ . The numerator is the entry in the row and columns titled ‘Total’ in Table V and the denominator is the wage income of the median AFQT scorer aged 30 in 1989 reported in Table III. The negative value of the estimate indicates that individuals receive benefits to induce them to move.

advantage of their estimates. Of more concern is the fact that KW estimate moving costs using data on the frequency of inter-*state* moves, while our quantitative model describes inter-*city* moves. Inter-city moves are more frequent than moves between states. Consequently it is possible that KW would have estimated a different value for moving costs had they had data on all inter-city moves, in which case we would be calibrating our model to the wrong value. This suggests it is important to quantify any bias in KW’s estimate arising from their focus on inter-state moves only. In Appendix D we study a calibrated variant of their model and find that any bias is likely to be small. We conclude that using KW’s estimate is valid in our context.

## 5.2. TFP and Substitutability of City-specific Goods

The calibration of the substitution parameter  $\chi$  and the stochastic process for TFP are interconnected because  $\chi$  is used to measure TFP. When we measure TFP using the procedure described in Section 2.2 its growth rate is well-represented as a stationary AR(1) process which is non-stationary in levels and therefore inconsistent with a steady state. To overcome this we assume a reflecting barrier process for TFP:

$$\ln s_{t+1} = \max \{g + (1 + \rho) \ln s_t - \rho \ln s_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{t+1}, \ln s_{\min}\}. \quad (23)$$

where  $\varepsilon_{t+1} \sim N(0, \sigma^2)$ ,  $g < 0$  and  $\rho > 0$ . With this process TFP growth is approximately AR(1), while its level is stationary due to having a negative drift and being reflected at the barrier  $\ln s_{\min}$  (normalized to zero).<sup>27</sup> The model’s endogenous variables will appear to be non-stationary over samples of similar length to our data.

The case  $\rho = 0$  was used by Gabaix (1999) to explain the cross section distribution of cities by population. In this case the invariant distribution has an exponential upper tail given by

$$\Pr [s_t > b] = \frac{d}{b^\omega}$$

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<sup>27</sup>Coen-Pirani (2010) assumes a stationary AR(2) for the level of TFP, calibrating it to match serial correlation in net state-to-state worker flows.

for scalar parameters  $d$  and  $\omega$ . A striking characteristic of cities is that when  $s$  measures a city’s population one typically finds that  $\omega \simeq 1$ . Equivalently a regression of log rank on log level of city populations yields a coefficient close to -1. This property is called Zipf’s law and so we refer to  $\omega$  as the Zipf coefficient. The case  $\rho > 0$ , which applies when TFP growth is serially correlated, has not been studied before. Simulations suggest this case behaves similarly to the  $\rho = 0$  case in that it has an invariant distribution with an exponential-like upper tail. We verify below that a version of Zipf’s law holds for TFP and so using the reflecting barrier process with  $\rho > 0$  seems justified.

Our calibration of  $\chi$  and (23) proceeds as follows. For a given  $\chi$  (and  $\theta$  and  $\gamma$  which are calibrated independently as discussed below) we measure TFP in the data following the procedure in Section 2.2, obtain its Zipf coefficient, and estimate an AR(1) in its growth rate. We then find the  $g$ ,  $\rho$  and  $\sigma$  to match the Zipf coefficient and the parameters of the estimated AR(1) using data simulated from our model and based on all of these parameters calculate the model’s population Zipf coefficient. The calibrated value of  $\chi$  is the one that generates a population Zipf coefficient that is as close as possible to the one we find in the data, 1.0. The best fit is at  $\chi = 0.9$  with a population Zipf coefficient equal to 1.3. The corresponding values of  $g$ ,  $\rho$  and  $\sigma$  are shown in Table 1.


Figure 5 demonstrates the model’s success at replicating the two Zipf’s laws by plotting log rank versus log level for population and TFP with empirical and simulated data.<sup>28</sup> Log level of TFP is calculated using (4) without the first difference operator. The scales in the plots differ because we use the cumulative distribution functions to measure rank in the model and TFP’s domain is narrower in the model because of the computational cost of matching the data.<sup>29</sup> Notice that TFP’s Zipf coefficient

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<sup>28</sup>The left plot is constructed using the top 200 cities by population in 1990. The right plot excludes the lower 5% of cities to be comparable and also the top 5% because of the technical necessity of limiting the upper bound of the TFP domain which introduces bunching at the top end of the population distribution.

<sup>29</sup>The narrower domain does not matter for our calibration. For example, the migration parameters are based on Figure 2 and KW’s estimate of migration costs. In the model the former does

Figure 5: Zipf’s Laws for Population and TFP



is larger than population’s in the data. This feature arises naturally in the model because population tends to be allocated away from lower toward higher TFP cities. Equivalently, the long run response of population to a TFP shock is larger than that of TFP. [Luttmer \(2007\)](#) finds a similar relationship between employment and TFP in an equilibrium model of firm size.

### 5.3. Labor Supply

The labor disutility parameters are calibrated to match statistics involving employment to population ratios. The multiplicative parameter  $\phi$  is chosen to match the ratio of aggregate civilian employment to population obtained from Census Bureau data. The curvature parameter  $\pi$  is chosen using the first order condition for labor supply in a city. In the model’s decentralization the representative household chooses labor supply to equate the disutility of putting an additional household member to

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not depend on the level of TFP and the latter depends on the distribution of TFP growth which is essentially independent of the domain. Our quantitative analysis is based on growth rates and so is similarly independent of the underlying domain.

work to the local wage. This implies:

$$(1 - \pi) (\Delta \hat{n}_{it} - \Delta \hat{p}_{it}) + \Delta \hat{w}_{it} = 0,$$

where  $n$  is the sum of  $n_y$  and  $n_h$  and the “delta” and “hat” notation is described in Section 2.2. Using the methods described in Section 2.2, we estimate the dynamic responses of  $\Delta \hat{n}_{it}$ ,  $\Delta \hat{p}_{it}$  and  $\Delta \hat{w}_{it}$  to a local TFP shock and calibrate  $\pi$  so that this equation holds in the period of a shock. Note that this procedure does not force the model to match these variables’ individual impulse responses even in the period of a shock.

#### 5.4. Remaining Parameters

Our strategy for calibrating the remaining parameters borrows from studies based on the neo-classical growth model. Several calibration targets involve GDP and we measure this in the model as

$$GDP = Y + I, \tag{24}$$

where  $Y$  is output of non-construction final goods and  $I$  is residential investment. Residential investment is measured as the value in contemporaneous consumption units of the total additions to local housing in a year. Specifically,

$$I = \int \left[ \beta \int q_h(z') dQ(s'; s, s_{-1}) \right] n_h(z)^\alpha k_h(z)^\vartheta b_h(z)^{1-\alpha-\vartheta} d\mu$$

where  $q_h$  denotes the price of residential structures. This price is obtained as the solution to the following no arbitrage condition

$$q_h(z) = r_h(z) + (1 - \delta_h) \beta \int q_h(z') dQ(s'; s, s_{-1})$$

where the rental price of residential structures,  $r_h$ , equals the marginal product of structures in the provision of housing services. The National Income and Product

Accounts (NIPA) measure of private residential investment is the empirical counterpart to  $I$ . Our empirical measure of  $Y$  is the sum of personal consumption expenditures less housing services, equipment investment and private business inventory investment. Because our model does not include non-residential structures investment, government expenditures and net exports we exclude these from our empirical concept of GDP.

Our measurement of model GDP and wages excludes the value of guided trip services, which might be problematic. For example, workers produce guided trips and in principle they should be compensated for this. We calculate the total value of guided trips in our baseline calibration to be 1.8% of model GDP. The decentralization described in Appendix B suggests we can interpret guided trips as encompassing many market and non-market activities. Some of these activities appear in the national accounts as business services and therefore count as intermediate inputs that appear only indirectly in measured GDP. Others do not appear anywhere in the national accounts because they are essentially home production or are impossible to measure. Fortunately, given its small size, including the total value of guided trips in model GDP and wages does not change our baseline calibration.

Measuring employment also is complicated by the fact that all household members participate in generating guided trips. We count those agents engaged in intermediate good production,  $n_y$ , and residential construction,  $n_h$ , as employed and measure their wages by their marginal products excluding the value of guided trips. The non-employed who also produce guided trips are assumed to be engaged in home production and so are not included in our accounting of employment. In Table 1 the labor share parameters are chosen to match total labor compensation as a share of GDP (the target is borrowed from traditional real business cycle studies) and our estimate of the share of residential construction employment in total private non farm employment.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>30</sup>We estimate residential construction employment by multiplying total construction employment by the average over our sample period of the nominal share of residential investment expenditures

We fix the discount rate so the model’s real interest rate is 4%. Combined with this target the equipment-output ratio in the non-construction sector,  $K_y/Y$ , identifies equipments’s share in that sector’s production. Our empirical measure of equipment for this calculation is the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ (BEA) measure of the stock of equipment capital. Equipment’s depreciation rate is identified using the investment to GDP ratio, where we measure investment using the NIPA estimate of equipment investment. Equipment’s share in residential construction is identified by the ratio of capital employed in the residential construction sector,  $K_h$ , to GDP where the empirical counterpart to capital in this ratio is the BEA measure of equipment employed in residential construction. The depreciation rate of residential structures is identified using the residential investment to GDP ratio.<sup>31</sup>

We identify the housing service parameters as follows. First the housing coefficient  $H$  is chosen to match the residential capital to GDP ratio, where the measurement of residential capital is consistent with our measure of residential investment described above. Land’s share in housing services,  $\zeta$ , is chosen to match the estimate of land’s share of the total value of housing in [Davis and Heathcote \(2007\)](#). To measure this object in the model we need the price of land,  $q_b$ . We obtain this variable as the solution to the no-arbitrage condition

$$q_b(z) = r_b(z) + \beta \int q_b(z') dQ(s'; s, s_{-1}),$$

where  $r_b$  denotes the rental price of land which equals the marginal product of land in the provision of housing services. Land’s share of the economy-wide value of housing is then given by  $\int q_b b_r d\mu / [\int q_h h d\mu + \int q_b b_r d\mu]$ .

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in total structures investment expenditures.

<sup>31</sup>The depreciation rate for residential structures obtained this way is close to the mean value of the (current cost) depreciation-stock ratio for residential structures obtained from the BEA publication “Fixed Assets and Consumer Durable Goods,” once output and population growth are taken into account. Calibrating to this alternative depreciation rate has virtually no impact on our quantitative findings.

## 6. Quantitative Analysis

We now consider the model’s empirical predictions. First, we confirm that the model accounts for population’s slow adjustment to TFP shocks and that this success comes with generally accurate predictions for the other variables we study. Next, we assess the model’s unconditional dynamics and find it is similarly successful even though TFP shocks are the only source of fluctuations in the model. After establishing the empirical plausibility of our framework, we investigate how migration and housing influence slow population adjustments.


### 6.1. Model Validation with Conditional Correlations

Comparisons of model and empirical impulse response functions is a model validation tool common in macroeconomics, see for example [Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans \(2005\)](#). Its key advantage over studying unconditional statistics, is that in principle it is robust to the presence of other shocks. We estimate the responses to TFP shocks of population, gross migration, employment, wages, residential investment and house prices in both the model and the data using the procedure described in [Section 2.2](#), basing our model responses on the simulation of a large panel of cities over a long time period. TFP is measured the same way with model generated and empirical data.

[Figure 6](#) displays model and estimated responses of population to a one standard deviation positive innovation to TFP. It demonstrates that the model’s population response is statistically and economically close to the one for the data. In other words our model accounts for the slow response of city populations to local TFP shocks. Note that the model is able to account for the unconditional population distribution depicted in [Figure 5](#) with a slow conditional response of population to a TFP shock because ultimately the long run response of population exceeds that for TFP.


[Figure 7](#) shows this accounting for slow population adjustments involves replicat-

Figure 6: Responses of Population



Note: Point estimates along with 2 standard error bands.

Figure 7: Responses of Arrival and Leaving Rates




Note: Point estimates along with 2 standard error bands.

ing quite closely the dynamic responses of the arrival and leaving rates.<sup>32</sup> Crucially the model is consistent with the negative conditional correlation between the gross

<sup>32</sup>The difference between the model's migration rates in the the first period do not correspond exactly to the response of population which in principle it should according to equation (15). The discrepancy is due to using logarithmic first differences to approximate the net rate of population growth.

migration rates. The intuition for this finding is simple. Having multiple margins to respond to the increase in productivity, the city planner takes advantage of all of them. It can raise employment per person and bring more workers to the city. For the latter it can cut back on the fraction of the initial population that leaves for other cities, that is reduce the leaving rate, and attract more workers to the city with more guided trips. The goodness-of-fit is weaker for gross migration than it is for population, for example both responses are more persistent than in the data and the arrival rate's initial response is a little too strong. Nevertheless given its simplicity the model does surprisingly well.

Figure 8: Responses of Labor and Housing Markets



Note: Point estimates along with 2 standard error bands.

Figure 8 shows the dynamic responses of employment, wages, residential investment and house prices. We define house prices,  $q_{sf}$ , as the total value of structures and land used to produce housing services per unit of housing services provided:

$$q_{sf}(z) = \frac{q_h(z)h(z) + q_b(z)b_n(z)}{h(z)^{1-\varsigma}b_r(z)^\varsigma}.$$

The price  $q_{sf}$  corresponds to the price of housing per square foot under the assumption that every square foot of built housing yields the same quantity of housing services.

The labor market responses are a very good fit. Observe that the employment response in the model, as in the data, is stronger than the population response. That is, the employment to population ratio rises after a positive TFP shock indicating that the labor supply margin is indeed exploited in both the data and the model. The qualitative responses of construction and housing also are consistent with the data. These findings derive from a higher population desiring additional housing and that local factor inputs with alternative uses are used in construction thereby creating an imperfectly elastic supply of new housing. The model is less successful accounting for the quantitative responses of housing. Residential investment misses the hump shape in the data and the house price response is too fast. However in both cases the order of magnitude of the responses are about right.<sup>33</sup>

## 6.2. The Model's Predictions for Unconditional Dynamics

A city's response to TFP shocks is in principle robust to the presence of other shocks and is therefore informative about model validity even with such shocks. However it is likely that there are shocks to local taxes, amenities and intermediate good demand and so it is worth knowing the extent to which TFP shocks alone account for unconditional moments of the data. Table 2 displays unconditional standard deviations, contemporaneous correlations, and auto-correlations of the same variables discussed above in the model and in our data.

The first thing to notice from Table 2 is that TFP shocks generate about two thirds of population's variance suggesting that they are a quantitatively important source of local variation. The model is strikingly successful at replicating the qualitative pattern of relative volatilities and only somewhat less successful quantitatively.

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<sup>33</sup>One explanation for housing's discrepancy with the data is that our model does not include search frictions in the local housing market. [Lloyd-Ellis et al. \(2014\)](#) demonstrate that search frictions show promise in generating serially correlated responses of construction and house price growth to productivity shocks.

Table 2: Volatility, Co-movement and Auto-Correlation Within Cities

Variable	Standard Deviation		Correlations		Auto-Correlations	
	Data	Model	Data	Model	Data	Model
Population	1.33	0.87	–	–	0.81	0.93
Arrival Rate	0.68	0.53	0.59	1.00	0.81	0.93
Leaving Rate	0.57	0.48	-0.43	-1.00	0.80	0.93
Employment	1.58	1.23	0.56	0.93	0.52	0.73
Wages	1.23	1.81	0.16	0.32	0.15	0.20
Res. Investment	19.7	4.27	0.14	0.40	0.12	0.09
House Prices	3.77	2.32	0.29	0.47	0.73	0.07

Note: The statistics are based levels of the gross migration rates and on the growth rates of the other variables. All variables have been transformed as described in Section 2. Standard deviations of all variables except population are expressed relative to the standard deviation for population. Correlations are with population.

Of note the model is consistent with residential construction being the most volatile variable, but it fluctuates much less in the model than in the data. House prices are more than twice as volatile as population in the model, but not quite as volatile as in the data. The high volatility of house prices is a direct consequence of construction having factor inputs with alternative uses. The model is qualitatively consistent with all the correlations with population growth.<sup>34</sup> Population, gross migration, employment and wages all display similar persistence to that in the data, although the model’s variables are more persistent. Construction in the model and data are similarly random-walk like, although this feature must be due to other shocks given the serially correlated growth after TFP shocks we find in the data. House prices display the greatest difference with substantial serial correlation in the data while in the model house prices are more like a random-walk.

<sup>34</sup>The largest discrepancies involve the arrival and leaving rates being perfectly positively and negatively correlated with population growth. Including a mechanism to reproduce KW’s finding that out-migration is relatively high for recent in-migrants might move the model in the direction of the data. See [Coen-Pirani \(2010\)](#) for one such mechanism.

### 6.3. The Source of Slow Population Adjustments

We now address the sources of slow population adjustments in our model. Figure 9 displays impulse responses to TFP shocks implied by several different versions of the model. The different versions consist of perturbations relative to the baseline, holding parameters not involved in the perturbation fixed at their baseline values. The “Free Guided Trips” case sets  $A = 0$ . This case is identical to assuming all the migration parameters are set to zero.<sup>35</sup> In this case only the housing frictions are operative. “No Location-Taste Shocks” is the case where  $\psi_1 = \psi_2 = 0$  so that costly guided trips are the only migration friction. “Mobile Housing” corresponds to the case in which housing can be rented at a fixed price from any city; housing is perfectly mobile and there are no adjustment costs. “Full Flexibility” combines all the perturbations so there are no migration costs and housing is perfectly mobile.

Figure 9 displays the levels of the responses.<sup>36</sup> It shows that in the Full Flexibility case the population dynamics essentially follow the path of TFP with roughly 90% of the five year adjustment occurring after 2 years compared to 85% for TFP (see Figure 3) – absent migration and housing frictions the model has essentially no internal mechanism to propagate TFP shocks.


The No Location-Taste Shocks and Mobile Housing cases are very close to the baseline, with the latter being almost the same. In other words removing from the model costly out-migration or immobile housing, leaving costly guided trips as the only model friction, leaves the population response essentially as slow as it is in the baseline economy and hence the data. In the Free Guided Trip case the population response is closer to the full-flexibility case and does not take the model all the way to the data. In the Free Guided Trip case the only friction is that housing is immobile,

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<sup>35</sup>This is because when guided trips are free the city-planner sets the leaving rate in each city to the constant value that minimizes leaving costs and adjusts population by changing the arrival rate at zero cost.

<sup>36</sup>What is not shown is that the long run response of population is completely pinned down by the size of the TFP shock. For example, the response in the baseline economy converges in the long run to the response in the Full Flexibility case.

Figure 9: Why is Population Slow to Adjust to Shocks?



suggesting some role for housing in slowing population adjustments.

Despite this last result, we still conclude that costly guided trips are the main source of slow population adjustments. The discrepancy of Free Guided Trips with Full Flexibility arises from a property of adjustment costs highlighted by [Abel and Eberly \(1994\)](#). The first adjustment cost introduced to an otherwise frictionless model always has a relatively large impact on dynamics. So, introducing immobile housing into an otherwise frictionless model has seemingly large effects. However immobile housing on its own is not sufficient to deliver the amplitude and persistence of the population response in the data. Yet, the population dynamics with migration costs and mobile housing, the Mobile Housing case, are essentially the same as the baseline. This suggests that the prime driver of slow population adjustment in the model is costly guided trips.

The finding of slow population adjustment driven mostly by costly migration confirms and reinforces results in KW. Using the parameters of a migration choice problem estimated with data on the frequency of inter-state moves taken from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, KW calculate optimal responses of individuals in all states to a one-time permanent change in wages of one particular state (they

consider changes in California, Illinois and New York). From these choices they obtain a matrix of transition probabilities which they simulate to trace out the response of population in the state to the permanent change in wages. Strikingly, we find roughly the same five year elasticity of population with respect to the wage, about 0.5.<sup>37</sup> KW find that about 30% of the five period response occurs in the first period (see their Figure 1), whereas we find a response closer to 20%. The slower initial response we obtain is consistent with the fact that in our analysis wages take a few periods to reach their long run level due to the nature of the TFP process we estimate and our identification taking into account feedback to future migration from lower wages induced by greater net in-migration. The fact that our model includes housing does not appear to be an important source of the difference. Overall our results establish that KW's findings are robust to the presence of housing and equilibrium interactions as well as considering migration between cities instead of states.

#### 6.4. Migration and Urban Decline


There are many cities which experience declining populations over the sample period 1985-2007. This is evidence of the persistent urban decline studied by Glaeser and Gyourko (2005). Interestingly, the cities with declining populations also have relative TFP declining for most of the sample. Our model's ability to reproduce the *short run* response of population to TFP shocks then suggests it might account for population dynamics over the *long run* and in particular persistent urban decline. We now discuss a simple experiment that demonstrates that indeed our calibrated model does account for persistent urban decline.

We focus on the 15 cities of the 365 total that experience the greatest population declines in our sample. The corresponding TFP paths are fed into the model from the common initial condition that takes the mid-point of our TFP grid and assumes TFP stays at that level for a long time. We use the first 12 years of our sample, 1985 to

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<sup>37</sup>KW consider a 10% increase in wages and find that population is 5% higher after five years. We find a 1.1% response of population to a 2% (roughly) permanent increase in the wage.

Figure 10: Persistent Urban Decline



1997, to simulate unique initial conditions for each city based on each city’s empirical TFP path. This procedure builds in the possibility that past declines in TFP show through into future population declines. For each city we calculate the predicted path for log population starting in 1998, average over these paths and compare the result to the same object constructed using the data.<sup>38</sup>

Figure 10 shows the average log paths for TFP and population for the data and the model. TFP falls by .06 from 1998-2007 and population falls by twice as much.<sup>39</sup> Strikingly, the model’s predicted path for population lies very close to its empirical counterpart. Obviously the fit is not as perfect for the individual cities, but the general impression is similar. There are two key factors driving the model’s success: persistent declines in TFP taken from the data and the very slow response of population to past declines in TFP predicted by the model. The impact of past TFP declines on current population is demonstrated by the faster rate of population decline relative to TFP – in the short run population’s response to a TFP innovation is much smaller than

<sup>38</sup>For this experiment we (incorrectly) equate our empirical measure of TFP to model TFP,  $s$ . We do this for computational tractability but the small differences involved should not affect our conclusions.

<sup>39</sup>The much larger drop in population is a reflection of the forces driving our model’s reproduction of Zipf’s law discussed above.

TFP's, but over longer horizons it responds by much more.

Since the dominant source of slow population adjustment in the model is the cost of finding new cities to live and work, we conclude that these costs are integral to our model's explanation of persistent urban decline. Durable and immobile housing is not important at all in the sense that migration frictions on their own essentially account for slow population adjustments. This contrasts with [Glaeser and Gyourko \(2005\)](#) who argue that durable and immobile housing explains persistent urban decline.<sup>40</sup> These authors do not integrate costly migration into their empirical analysis. We consider both housing and migration costs in a unified framework, but housing turns out to be unimportant.

## 7. Conclusion

This paper documents that population adjusts slowly to near random-walk TFP shocks and proposes an explanation for why: the incentive to reallocate population after a TFP shock is limited by costs of finding new cities to live and work. We show that these same costs can also account for the persistence of urban decline. The framework that delivers these results is not arbitrary, but is dictated by the nature of the relationship between gross and net population flows in cities that we uncover in our panel of 365 cities from 1985 to 2007 and microeconomic estimates of migration costs from KW.

Our model has left out interesting features that are undoubtedly important for understanding the full range of adjustment to shocks within and across cities. For example we have abstracted from search frictions in local labor and housing markets. We think it would be interesting to add these features to our framework. Doing so

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<sup>40</sup>They show that irreversible housing in cities with declining populations has several empirical predictions which they verify in the data. Our model does not share these predictions since the irreversibility constraint is never binding. It is never binding because of the relatively small variance of TFP innovations compared to the depreciation rate for housing. This constraint appears not to bind in our data as new building permits are always strictly positive. It presumably binds for neighborhoods within a city and this might play a role in explaining [Glaeser and Gyourko \(2005\)](#)'s findings.

would help disentangle the contributions to labor reallocation of traditional search from the migration frictions we introduce. For example, local housing and labor search frictions might play a role similar to the migration frictions in our framework. It remains to be determined whether these frictions can account for the empirical relationship between gross and net migration and the slow response of population to TFP shocks that we uncover.

We abstracted from secular decline in rates of gross migration as well. While our model is able to explain persistent urban decline as the slow response of population to declines in local TFP, it is possible that this mechanism interacts with others that have been proposed to explain the trend. Understanding whether such an interaction exists seems worth exploring in future research.

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## Appendix

This appendix describes how we calculate gross migration flows using IRS data; one possible decentralization of the migration problem; why housing influences urban population dynamics; how we quantify the bias in using migration costs based on inter-state migration in a model of inter-city migration; calibration of parameters not discussed in the main text; and the methods used to solve the quantitative model.

### A. Calculating Gross Migration Flows with IRS Data

We construct data on gross MSA-level population inflows and outflows using county-county migration data based on tax records that is constructed by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). These data are available annually from 1990 onwards on the IRS web site and are available from 1983 through through 1992 at the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) web site. The data are annual and cover the “filing year” period, not calendar year. For example, the data for 2007 approximately refer to migration over the period April, 2007 to April, 2008.

For each of the years, the IRS reports the migration data using two files, one for outflows and one for inflows. These files cover the experience of each county in the United States. Both the inflow and the outflow files report migrants in units of “returns” and in units of “personal exemptions.” According to information from the IRS web site, the returns data approximates the number of households and the personal exemptions data approximates the population.<sup>41</sup> We use the exemptions data.

We define gross inflows into an MSA as the sum of all migrants into any county in that MSA, as long as the inflows did not originate from a county within the MSA. Analogously, we define gross outflows from an MSA as the sum of all migrants leaving any county in that MSA, as long as the migrants did not ultimately move to another county in the MSA. We exclude people migrating into- and out of the United States. But otherwise, for gross inflows the originating counties are not restricted to be part of one of the 365 MSAs, and for gross outflows the counties receiving the migrants are not restricted to be included in one of the 365 MSAs. Over our sample period, counties inside MSAs slightly increased in population, on-net, relative to counties outside of MSAs.

Define  $a$  as the number of new entrants to an MSA during a given year,  $l$  as the number of people exiting the MSA during the year, and  $\bar{p}$  as all the people that did not move into or out of the MSA during the year. We compute the beginning of year population  $x$  and end of year population  $p$  as

$$x = \bar{p} + l$$

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<sup>41</sup>See <http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/article/0,,id=212683,00.html> for details.

$$p = \bar{p} + a$$

Net migration is therefore  $p - x = a - l$ . Note that due to births and deaths and foreign migration,  $p$  in any given year is typically less than  $x$  in the subsequent year.

## B. One Possible Decentralization of the Static Model

Decentralizing the static model's planning problem is useful for calibrating the quantitative model. The key challenge involved is how to treat guided trips. One valid approach is to have guided trips allocated entirely within the household through home production without any market interactions. We view guided trips in the model as an amalgam of both market and non-market activities and so we think a more natural approach involves both activities. We now consider such a decentralization.

Markets are competitive. Firms in a city of type  $z$  hire labor at wage  $w(z)$  and produce consumption goods to maximize profits. Household members initially located in a type- $z$  city produce  $a_m(z)$  guided trips to that city which they sell to prospective migrants at price  $q(z)$ . The household also home produces guided trips, denoted by  $a_h(z)$ . Let  $m(z)$  denote the total number of guided trips to  $z$ -type cities purchased by household members in the market.

The representative household solves the following optimization problem

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\substack{\{C, \Lambda, m(z), \\ a_m(z), a_h(z), \\ l(z), p(z)\}}} \left\{ \ln C - \int \left[ \frac{A}{2} \left( \frac{a_m(z) + a_h(z)}{x} \right)^2 x \right. \right. \\ \left. \left. + \left( -\psi_1 \frac{l(z)}{x} + \frac{\psi_2}{2} \left( \frac{l(z)}{x} \right)^2 \right) x \right] d\mu - \tau \Lambda \right\} \end{aligned} \quad (25)$$

subject to:

$$C + \int q(z) m(z) d\mu = \int q(z) a_m(z) d\mu + \int w(z) p(z) d\mu + \int \Pi(z) d\mu \quad (26)$$

$$p(z) = x + m(z) + a_h(z) + \Lambda x - l(z), \quad \forall z \quad (27)$$

$$\int l(z) d\mu = \int [m(z) + a_h(z) + \Lambda x] d\mu \quad (28)$$

along with non-negativity constraints on the choice variables. Equation (26) is the household's budget constraint where  $\Pi$  denotes profits from owning the firms. Equation (27) states that the population of a city after migration equals the initial population plus migrants from guided trips and undirected migration less the initial population that migrates out of the city. Finally, equation (28) states that the household members that migrate to cities must equal the number of household members

that migrate out of cities.

The unique competitive equilibrium is defined in the usual way. Using the market clearing condition  $m(z) = a_m(z)$  and the first order conditions of the household's problem we verify that a competitive equilibrium only determines the total number of guided trips into a city,  $a_m(z) + a_h(z)$ . The composition of these guided trips between market and non-market activities is left undetermined.

This particular decentralization makes it possible to calculate the total value of guided trips. In particular, as long as there are some guided trips purchased in the marketplace their total value is given by  $q(z)a(z)$ , with  $a(z) = a_m(z) + a_h(z)$  and  $q(z) = CAa(z)/x$ .

### C. Urban Population Dynamics with Housing

We expect housing to influence urban population dynamics for the reasons stated in the introduction: it is costly to build quickly, durable and immobile. Here we study a simple model to explain why these factors may be important. The model borrows the geography and production structure from Section 3. There are three differences with that model: individuals have a preference for housing services; to emphasize the role of housing, the model excludes migration frictions; and to study dynamics the model introduces infinitely lived households.

To analyze this simple model it is convenient to exploit the fact that the unique stationary competitive equilibrium can be obtained as the solution to a representative city planner's problem that maximizes local net surplus taking economy-wide variables as given, where the economy-wide variables are constrained to satisfy particular side conditions.<sup>42</sup> Since here we are only interested in the qualitative implications of housing we ignore the side conditions and study the city planner's problem assuming the economy-wide variables are exogenous. When we analyze our quantitative model below we take into account the relevant side conditions so that the economy-wide variables are determined endogenously.

Gross surplus in the representative city is given by

$$E_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left\{ s_t p_t^\theta + H \ln\left(\frac{h_t}{p_t}\right) p_t \right\}$$

where  $E_0$  denotes the date  $t = 0$  conditional expectations operator and  $0 < \beta < 1$  is the household's time discount factor. Housing services are perfectly divisible so that each individual in the city enjoys  $h_t/p_t$  units of housing services where  $h_t$  denotes the local housing stock. The total utility individuals in the city derive from housing is given by  $H \ln(h_t/p_t)p_t$ ,  $H > 0$ . The planner must give up  $\eta > 0$  units of surplus for each individual it brings to the city and employs in the production of consumption

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<sup>42</sup>This is the same property we exploit when we analyze the quantitative model.

goods.

Within this framework we consider the speed of adjustment of population to a one time permanent change to TFP. To be concrete, suppose the city is in a steady state at  $t = 0$  with  $s = s_0$  and then at date  $t = 1$  it faces a one-time unanticipated permanent change in TFP to  $s = s^*$ . We consider the adjustment of population to this unanticipated change in TFP under three scenarios for housing.

In the first scenario the planner can rent housing services from other cities at the exogenous price  $r_h$ . This assumption is equivalent to assuming that housing is perfectly mobile across cities. Equilibrium in this scenario is characterized by the first order conditions for population and housing:

$$s_t \theta p_t^{\theta-1} + H \ln\left(\frac{h_t}{p_t}\right) = \eta + H; \quad (29)$$

$$H \frac{p_t}{h_t} = r_h. \quad (30)$$

Condition (29) shows that population adjusts to equate the marginal benefit of moving an additional individual to a city to the cost. The former is the sum of the individual's marginal product and housing services, while the latter includes the shadow cost of not moving the individual to another city and the housing services that are lost by the original inhabitants of the receiving city. The second condition equates the marginal utility of an extra unit of housing services with its cost. Replacing housing per individual in (29) using (30) yields

$$H \ln\left(\frac{H}{r_h}\right) - H + s_t \theta p_t^{\theta-1} = \eta. \quad (31)$$

The key feature of (31) is that it does not include the housing stock,  $h_t$ . This means that after the unanticipated change in TFP population jumps immediately to its new permanent level  $p = p^*$  found as the solution to (31) with  $s_t = s^*$ . So, when housing is perfectly mobile it is irrelevant for population dynamics.

Now assume the city is endowed with  $h_0$  units of housing at  $t = 0$  and that housing is immobile, meaning that it cannot be rented from or to any other city. In addition, suppose the change in TFP at  $t = 1$  coincides with the onset of a potentially different exogenous path of the local housing stock satisfying

$$\ln h_t - \ln h^* = \rho_h^{t-1} (\ln h_0 - \ln h^*) \quad (32)$$

for  $t \geq 1$ ,  $0 \leq \rho_h < 1$ , and  $h^*$  is the new long run level for  $h$ . Equilibrium population is determined by (29) conditional on (32). We consider two cases for this scenerio.

First suppose that the local, immobile housing stock does not change with TFP, that is  $h^* = h_0$ . From (29) after the change in TFP  $p$  jumps immediately to its new level given by the value  $p^*$  that solves this equation. The new long run level

of population depends on  $h_0$  but the speed of adjustment to  $p^*$  is the same as when housing is perfectly mobile. In other words the presence of local, immobile housing is not sufficient for housing to affect population dynamics.

The second case is the new long run level of housing changes with TFP,  $h^* \neq h_0$ . We approximate the transition of population to its new steady state in this case by log linearizing (29) around  $\ln p^*$  and  $\ln h^*$ . This yields

$$\ln p_t - \ln p^* = \frac{H}{H + s^*\theta(1 - \theta)p^{*\theta-1}\rho_h^{t-1}} (\ln h_0 - \ln h^*).$$

In this case the speed of convergence of population to its new steady state  $p^*$  is directly related to the speed of convergence of housing to its new steady state through  $\rho_h$ . If the adjustment of housing is immediate,  $\rho_h = 0$ , then population's adjustment is instantaneous as in the case when  $h^* = h_0$ . If  $0 < \rho_h < 1$  then population adjusts in proportion to the adjustment of housing.

We conclude that housing must be immobile and adjust slowly to changes in local productivity for it to affect population dynamics. It follows that a plausible quantitative analysis of urban population dynamics in response to TFP shocks must include endogenous immobile housing and include the possibility of its slow adjustment. Natural candidates for influencing the speed of adjustment of housing are construction depending on local resources and durability which is the approach we take when formulating our quantitative model.

#### D. Inter-state and Inter-city Migration Costs in the [Kennan and Walker \(2011\)](#) Model

We now justify our conclusion that it is valid to apply KW's estimate of migration costs in our environment. The argument is based on a calibrated model that incorporates the essence of the individual discrete choice problem studied by KW within an equilibrium setting.

There are  $N$  locations called cities. Each city  $i$  is associated with a wage that is fixed over time,  $w_i$ .<sup>43</sup> A person living in city  $i$  receives the wage and then receives a vector of i.i.d. preference shocks, one for each city including the person's current city,  $e = (e_1, e_2, \dots, e_N)$ . After receiving the preference shocks, the person decides whether to move. The expected value of living in city  $i$  before the shocks are realized

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<sup>43</sup>For simplicity we abstract from idiosyncratic wage shocks included by KW. KW assume that individuals are finitely lived and only know the permanent component of wages of their current city and any city they have lived in previously. In an infinite horizon context individuals eventually live in every city and therefore have knowledge of the complete wage distribution.

but after the wage is paid is

$$V_i = E \left[ \max_{j \in \{1, \dots, N\}} \left\{ \frac{w_i}{\alpha} - \frac{c(i, j)}{\alpha} + e_j + \beta V_j \right\} \right]$$

Let  $s$  denote the state (a unique grouping of cities) containing city  $i$  and  $s'$  the state containing  $j$ . The moving cost function  $c(i, j)$  is

$$c(i, j) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } i = j \\ c_1, & \text{if } i \neq j \text{ and } s = s' \\ c_2, & \text{if } i \neq j \text{ and } s \neq s' \end{cases}$$

People pay no moving costs if they do not move, and in-state moving costs  $c_1$  may be different than out-of-state moving costs  $c_2$ . Allowing  $c_1$  to be different from  $c_2$  is in the spirit of KW's finding that moving costs increase with distance moved.<sup>44</sup>

Following KW we assume that the preference shocks are drawn from the Type 1 Extreme Value Distribution. Given a wage for each location  $w_i$  and the parameters of the model,  $\alpha$ ,  $\beta$ ,  $c_1$  and  $c_2$ , we compute the value functions using backwards recursion. We start with a guess of the expected value functions for every  $j = 1, \dots, N$ . Call the current guess of the expected value function at location  $j$  as  $\widehat{V}_j$ . We then update the guess at each  $i = 1, \dots, N$

$$\widetilde{V}_i = \log \left\{ \sum_{j=1}^N \left[ \exp \left( \frac{w_i}{\alpha} - \frac{c(i, j)}{\alpha} + \beta \widehat{V}_j \right) \right] \right\} + \zeta$$

where  $\zeta$  is Euler's constant and  $\widetilde{V}_i$  is the updated guess. We repeat this entire process until the expected value functions have converged, that is until  $\widehat{V}_i$  is equal to  $\widetilde{V}_i$  at each of the  $i = 1, \dots, N$  cities.

We set  $N = 365$ . For each city, we set  $w_i$  equal to the average wage in the corresponding MSA in 1990 (the year KW use to calculate average state wages) in thousands of dollars. For states that span multiple MSAs, we set the state  $s$  as the state where most of the population of the MSA lives in 1990.<sup>45</sup>

We assume that  $\beta = 0.96$ , leaving three parameters to be estimated:  $\alpha$ , which scales the shocks into dollar equivalents, and the two moving costs  $c_1$  and  $c_2$ . We estimate these parameters by targeting three moments: the average rate of individual migration across all MSAs, 4.47 percent, the average rate of across-state migration, 3.0 percent, and the average flow benefit scaled by average wage experienced by migrants, 1.9. For a worker moving from city  $i$  to city  $j$ , the flow benefit (scaled to dollars) is  $\alpha(e_j - e_i) - c(i, j)$ . Our target value of the average flow benefits of across-state

<sup>44</sup>See the estimate of  $\gamma_1$  in Table II on page 230 of their paper.

<sup>45</sup>Some MSAs span multiple states and this may introduce some error because within-MSA across-state moves that are truly within MSA will be misclassified as moves to a new labor market.

movers scaled by average wage is taken from estimates produced by KW (see footnote 26 in the main text.) We use data from the IRS for 1990 to compute across-MSA and across-state migration rates. Our estimate of the across-state migration rate is almost identical to the estimate reported in Table VIII, page 239 by KW of 2.9 percent.

We compute all three moments analytically. The probability agents migrate to location  $j$  given their current location of  $i$ ,  $\gamma(j, i)$  has the straightforward expression

$$\gamma(j, i) = \frac{\exp\left(\frac{w_i}{\alpha} - \frac{c(i, j)}{\alpha} + \beta V_j\right)}{\sum_{k=1}^N \left[ \exp\left(\frac{w_i}{\alpha} - \frac{c(i, k)}{\alpha} + \beta V_k\right) \right]}.$$

We construct the  $N \times N$  matrix  $\Gamma$ , with individual elements  $\gamma(j, i)$ , and determine the steady state distribution of population across metro areas, the  $N$ -dimensional vector  $\rho$ , such that  $\rho = \Gamma\rho$ . Given  $\rho$ , we compute the probability of any move at the steady-state population distribution as

$$\sum_{i=1}^N \rho(i) \left[ \sum_{j \neq i} \gamma(j, i) \right]$$

and the probability of an across-state move as

$$\sum_{i=1}^N \rho(i) \left[ \sum_{j \neq i, s' \neq s} \gamma(j, i) \right].$$

For the third moment, it can be shown that the expected increase in continuation value from a worker choosing the optimal location as compared to an arbitrary location is a function of the probability the worker chooses the arbitrary location. For example, for a worker that optimally moves to location  $j$ , the expected increase in value, inclusive of flow utility and discounted future expected value, over remaining in the current location  $i$  is  $-\log \gamma(i, i) / (1 - \gamma(i, i))$ , see Kennan (2008). The expected increase in current flow payoff for all moves from  $j$  to  $i$  is therefore

$$\frac{-\log \gamma(i, i)}{1 - \gamma(i, i)} - \beta(V_j - V_i).$$

The average of this second term across all moves, from  $i$  to all  $j \neq i$ , is

$$\frac{\sum_{j \neq i} \gamma(j, i) \beta(V_j - V_i)}{\sum_{k \neq i} \gamma(k, i)} = \frac{\sum_{j \neq i} \gamma(j, i) \beta(V_j - V_i)}{1 - \gamma(i, i)}.$$

The denominator is the probability a move occurs. Thus, conditional on moving, the

average benefit of all moves that occur relative to staying put is

$$\sum_i \left( \frac{\rho(i)}{1 - \gamma(i, i)} \right) \left( -\log \gamma(i, i) - \sum_{j \neq i} \gamma(j, i) \beta (V_j - V_i) \right).$$

We divide this expression by average wage (appropriately scaled), evaluated at the steady state:  $\sum_i \rho(i) w_i / \alpha$ .

We use the Nelder-Meade algorithm to search for parameters and we match our 3 target moments exactly. Our parameter estimates are  $c_1 = 76.7$ ,  $c_2 = 116.6$ , and  $\alpha = 17.6$ . For reference, the mean wage at the steady state population distribution is 39.051 (\$39,051). Our estimates of  $c_1$  and  $c_2$  imply that in-state and out-of-state moving costs are twice and three times average wages, respectively. These large costs generate low mobility rates in the face of large permanent wage differentials across metro areas. However, the estimated value of  $\alpha$  implies that the mean and variance of the preference shocks are large. This large variance generates shocks large enough to induce people to move given the high costs of moving.

To determine the size of the bias in the KW estimates from using across-state moves, rather than across-MSA moves, we run 100 simulations of the model, simulating 600,000 people per MSA in each run. This generates approximately 27,000 moves to any MSA and 20,000 out of state moves for each MSA in the simulation. In each simulation run, we compute the economy-wide average flow benefits to across-state movers scaled by average wages. Averaged across the 100 simulations, the average benefit to across-state movers scaled by average wage is exactly 2.0, 0.1 higher than the average simulated benefits accruing to all movers. The bias is therefore 5%.<sup>46</sup> We find that a bias of this size does not affect our conclusions.

## E. Solving the Quantitative Model

While representing the solution of the economy-wide social planner's as the solution to a city planner's problem plus side conditions is a huge simplification, computing the solution to the city planner's problem remains a nontrivial task.

The first difficulty is that the value function of the city planner's problem has two endogenous variables and two exogenous state variables where the latter two have very large domains. Each exogenous state variable takes values in a finite grid but this grid cannot be too coarse if the resulting discrete process is to represent the original AR(2) in a satisfactory way. To make the task of computing the value function manageable we used spline approximations.

Cubic spline interpolation is usually used in these cases. A difficulty with these

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<sup>46</sup>Measured across the 100 runs, the standard deviation of the percent of the bias is 0.2%, the minimum bias is 4.6% and the maximum bias is 5.7%.

methods is that they do not necessarily preserve the shape of the original function, or if they do (as with Schumacher shape-preserving interpolation) it is somewhat difficult to compute. For these reasons, we use a local method that does not interpolate the original function but that approximates it while preserving shape (monotonicity and concavity). An additional benefit is that it is extremely simple to compute (there is no need to solve a system of equations). The method is known as the Shoenberg's variation diminishing spline approximation. It was first introduced by [Shoenberg \(1967\)](#) and is described in a variety of sources (e.g. [Lyche and Morken \(2011\)](#)).

For a given continuous function  $f$  on an interval  $[a, b]$ , let  $p$  be a given positive integer, and let  $\tau = (\tau_1, \dots, \tau_{n+p+1})$  be a knot vector with  $n \geq p + 1$ ,  $a \leq \tau_i \leq b$ ,  $\tau_i \leq \tau_{i+1}$ ,  $\tau_{p+1} = a$  and  $\tau_{n+1} = b$ . The *variation diminishing spline approximation of degree  $p$  to  $f$*  is then defined as

$$S_p(x) = \sum_{j=1}^n f(\tau_j^*) B_{jp}(x)$$

where  $\tau_j^* = (\tau_{j+1} + \dots + \tau_{j+p})/p$  and  $B_{jp}(x)$  is the  $j$ th  $B$ -spline of degree  $p$  evaluated at  $x$ . The  $B$ -splines are defined recursively as follows

$$B_{jp}(x) = \frac{x - \tau_j}{\tau_{j+p} - \tau_j} B_{j,p-1}(x) + \frac{\tau_{j+1+p} - x}{\tau_{j+1+p} - \tau_{j+1}} B_{j+1,p-1}(x)$$

with

$$B_{j0}(x) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } \tau_j \leq x < \tau_{j+1} \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

As already mentioned, this spline approximation preserves monotonicity and concavity of the original function  $f$  (e.g. [Lyche and Morken \(2011\)](#), Section 5.2). The definition of variation diminishing splines is easily generalized to functions of more than one variable using tensor products (e.g. [Lyche and Morken \(2011\)](#), Section 7.2.1). These properties greatly simplify the value function iterations of the city planner's problem and they should prove useful in a variety of other settings. In our actual computations we worked with an approximation of degree  $p = 3$ .

An additional complication involves the return function of the city planner's problem. Conditional on the current states  $(h, x, s, s_{-1})$  and future states  $(h', x')$ , evaluating the one period return function of the city planner requires solving a nonlinear system of equations in  $(n_y, n_h, k_y, k_h, b_r, b_h)$  allowing for the possibility that the constraint  $n_y + n_h \leq x'$  may bind. This is not a hard task. However, doing this for every combination of  $(h, x, s, s_{-1})$  and  $(h', x')$  considered in solving the maximization problem at each value function iteration would slow down computations quite considerably. For this reason, we chose to construct a cubic variation-diminishing spline approximation to the return function  $R(h, x, s, s_{-1}, h', x')$  once, before starting the value function iterations, and use this approximation instead. In practice, for each

value of  $(h, x, s, s_{-1})$  we used a different knot vector for  $h'$  and  $x'$  to gain accuracy of the return function over the relevant range.

Performing the maximization over  $(h', x')$  for each value of  $(h, x, s, s_{-1})$  at each value function iteration is a well behaved problem given the concavity of the spline approximations to the return function and the next period value function. There are different ways of climbing such a nice hill in an efficient way. In our case, given that we could offload computations into two Tesla C2075 graphic cards (with a total of 896 cores), we used the massively parallel capabilities of the system to implement a very simple generalized bisection method. Essentially for each value of  $(h, x, s, s_{-1})$  we used a block of  $16 \times 16$  threads to simultaneously evaluate  $16 \times 16$  combinations of  $(h', x')$  over a predefined square. We then zoom to the smallest square area surrounding the highest value and repeat. In practice, a maximum would be found after only three or four passes.

Statistics under the invariant distribution were computed using Monte Carlo simulations. This part of the computations was also offloaded to the graphic cards to exploit their massively parallel capabilities. To avoid costly computations similar to those encountered in the evaluation of the return function, cubic spline approximations were used for all decision rules.

Speeding up the solution to the city planner's problem and Monte Carlo simulations was crucial since finding solutions  $(Y, C, \Lambda, \eta)$  to the side conditions requires solving the city planner's problem and simulating its solution several times.

The source code, which is written in CUDA Fortran, is available upon request. Compiling it requires the PGI Fortran compiler. Running it requires at least one NVIDIA graphic card with compute capability higher than 2.0.