



RESERVE BANK OF AUSTRALIA

27 January 2026

Payments

Settlements Outage

RITS Low Value Clearing and
Settlement Services and property
batch disruptions

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Executive Summary

On Tuesday 27 January 2026, a technology incident disrupted some of the low value payment and settlement services operated by the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA). The RBA apologises for the disruption and is undertaking a program of work to strengthen controls and reduce the risk of recurrence.

This report outlines what occurred, the root causes, the impacts on services and participants, and the actions the RBA will take to prevent similar disruptions including several actions relevant to industry.

In summary:

- The incident affected the Low Value Clearing Service (LVCS) and the Low Value Settlement Service (LVSS) between 9:49 and 16:38, resulting in 6 hours and 49 minutes of disruption. It also delayed property settlement in RITS between 9:49 and 17:17, a disruption of 7 hours and 28 minutes.
- A second, separate issue occurred later that evening between 19:32 and 22:24, interrupting property settlement processing for a further 2 hours and 52 minutes.
- LVCS and LVSS support the exchange and settlement of low-value retail payment files between financial institutions.¹ RITS property batches support the settlement of interbank obligations arising from property transactions.

The initial disruption was caused by an expired intermediate certificate on the database platform supporting several RITS applications, including the file transfer system that processes LVCS, LVSS and property files. Installation of a valid certificate and a controlled restart of RITS processing restored the affected services.

The second disruption occurred when an internal system failed to handle the submission of duplicate property settlement files. This error blocked the processing of subsequent property settlement requests. Manual correction was required before processing could resume.

The RBA has identified a comprehensive set of action items arising from the incident. These include detailed reviews of systems, processes and contingency arrangements within the RBA and across industry. Further actions may be identified as this work progresses.

¹ The LVCS facilitates secure exchange of payment files between some financial institutions, mainly for payroll, invoices, regular bill payments and other everyday retail transactions. Most low value payment file transfers do not use the LVCS and are instead exchanged directly between financial institutions. The LVSS is used to submit instructions to RITS to settle interbank obligations arising from low value payments including cheques, direct entry and retail card payments (other than Mastercard and eftpos). RITS settles these obligations in five intraday settlement runs between 10:45 and 21:15, or in the 9 am processing session on the next RITS day.

Incident Description

The Main Outage

At 09:45, alerts were received indicating errors with certain RITS applications connecting to their databases, preventing the authentication and establishment of new database connections. The main affected application was the file transfer system used to process LVCS, LVSS and property settlement files. An internal incident bridge was initiated to commence technical investigations and recovery processes.

The RITS Help Desk also received several telephone calls from RITS members from 10:15 to around midday reporting technical issues associated with the affected file types.

While the file transfer system continued to accept inbound files until 10:07, it was unable to forward files to RITS (for LVSS and property) or to external recipients (for LVCS). The file transfer system was unavailable for most of the day, from 09:49 to 16:38, when LVCS and LVSS processing recommenced. Processing of property settlement in RITS recommenced at 17:17, after the property settlement batch processes were restarted.

Following the file transfer system recovery there was high utilisation of file transmission which caused a large backlog. This required subsequent restarts of the file transfer system between 18:55–19:10.

The Second Issue

A second issue arose in the evening at 19:09, leading to RITS processing of property settlement batches to halt at 19:32. During this period, property batches that had been received by RITS were unable to settle due an error with an internal system mechanism designed to handle duplicate files. This prevented the processing of newly received settlement requests. Property settlement processing in RITS remained unavailable until the issue was resolved, with settlements recommencing at 22:10, and full resolution at 22:24.

Other Settlement Services

Receipt of other settlement instructions into RITS and the FSS continued, and settlement proceeded as normal. The only interruption to RITS settlement of other transactions during the period was the deliberately initiated downtime of RITS processing undertaken as part of the service restoration activities, which is described in the Recovery section.

Table 1 below outlines the disruption to RBA services. Appendix 1 sets out the sequence of events on the day.

Table 1: Service Downtime

Service	Time	Duration
LVCS	09:49–16:38	6 hours 49 minutes
LVSS	09:49–16:38 ^(a)	6 hours 49 minutes
RITS	16:03–16:28 ^(b)	25 minutes
Property Settlement	09:49–17:17	7 hours 28 minutes
	19:32–22:24 ^(c)	2 hours 52 minutes

(a) Some settlements were processed in RITS during this period as files had been received prior to the outage.

(b) RITS processing was deliberately halted to enable remediation of the certificate issue.

(c) Property settlements initially recommenced at 22:10, with full restoration at 22:24.

Source: RITS Help Desk

Incident Root Cause

The initial incident was caused by an expired intermediate certificate on the database platform used by RITS applications, including the file transfer system, which prevented new authenticated database connections from being established. A new intermediate certificate had been issued on 17 May 2025; however, it had not been installed. The incident highlights underlying weaknesses in intermediate certificate lifecycle management, including monitoring, ownership and renewal controls. A deeper root-cause analysis is underway to identify and address these issues.

The second issue occurred when RITS received duplicate settlement requests for 126 property settlement batch transactions. The system was under heavy load, and the duplicate checking mechanism failed to detect duplicate submissions. Although the database prevented duplicate batches from being settled, this also blocked the processing of subsequent settlement requests. Manual intervention was required to correct the duplicate requests, and to allow settlement processing to resume.

Recovery

The Main Outage

A valid intermediate certificate was implemented and successfully verified in the Pre-Production Environment. This process was then applied to the Production Environment.

To apply the updated certificate, RITS processing was deliberately stopped from 16:03 to 16:28 during an announced maintenance window. During this period, settlement of High Value Clearing System (HVCS) and Austraclear transactions was unavailable, while FSS settlement continued uninterrupted.

The file transfer service was restarted at 16:30, and LVCS and LVSS processing was restored at 16:38. Property settlement processes were restarted at 17:15 to address subsequent connectivity issues, and property settlement resumed at 17:17.

The Second Issue

Recovery of property settlement processing in RITS following the second issue required a manual update to the status of 126 duplicate property transactions. This commenced around 22:10, with full restoration from 22:24. Property settlement cut-off times and the closure of RITS were extended to 22:45 to allow settlement processing to continue.

FSS

As a precautionary measure, additional certificate remediation activities were performed for the FSS database between 20:00 and 20:45. There was no impact to FSS settlement during or following this activity.

Member Impact

LVCS

Payment files exchanged via the LVCS were delayed during the main outage, affecting the two participants that rely on the service to exchange files, and their counterparties. The affected participants engaged bilaterally with their counterparties to undertake a reconciliation of files and arrange for some to be resent where necessary. For some participants, these activities continued for more than two days. The RBA is investigating an issue that arose on the day, that prevented the RITS Help Desk from determining the status of some files, which complicated the reconciliation process.

LVSS

The submission of LVSS files into RITS for the first three multilateral settlement runs of the day was materially reduced. Only 60 bilateral settlements occurred at 10:45, none at 13:45, and 20 at 16:45, compared with a typical volume of around 220–250 per run. Catchup occurred in later settlement runs, with 724 bilateral settlements occurring at 19:15 and 291 at 21:15. A further 32 arrived after closure of the final multilateral run and did not settle on the day.

Property Settlement

Eighteen property batches settled prior to the initial outage. Between restoration at 17:17 and the second issue, 1,777 property batches were settled, with a further 2,759 batches settling following recommencement of processing after the second issue. A total of 526 property settlement batches did not complete settlement before RITS closed on 27 January. Following reconciliation by the property batch administrator, the outstanding batches were resent and settled in the following days.

Other Settlement Services

RITS processing was deliberately stopped from 16:03 to 16:28 to apply the updated certificates. During this time, settlement of obligations arising from the High Value Clearing System (HVCS) and Austraclear was unavailable. The RITS Day session which normally occurs from 09:15 to 16:30, was extended to 17:00 to enable settlement of these obligations to complete. Further Day session extensions were not required.

Australian dollar payments to CLS Bank to settle foreign exchange transactions through CLS took place without disruption.

The FSS continued operating as normal. Other settlement streams including the eftpos and Mastercard card batches and the CHESS batch of obligations arising from equity transactions were not affected.

Actions

The RBA has developed a comprehensive set of action items in response to the incident, incorporating feedback from RITS members.

1. Undertake a review of the governance and control arrangements related to the certificate renewal and lifecycle processes for RITS

Issues with intermediate certificate renewal processes caused the disruption, indicating gaps in governance and lifecycle oversight. The RBA aims to maintain a strong change control environment for its systems and takes incidents very seriously. Several actions have already been taken to address the immediate issue and ensure that no other certificates are approaching expiry. The RBA will conduct a comprehensive review of the governance and control arrangements that support certificate lifecycle management for RITS.

2. Review duplicate checking mechanisms for property settlement and test under load

The incident highlighted that near-simultaneous submission of duplicate property batches can lead to inconsistent processing outcomes. The RBA will review the system response to duplicate submissions under normal and peak-load conditions to identify any gaps in duplicate detection and make any improvements required.

3. Strengthen monitoring of property settlement

Real-time monitoring of property batch settlement in RITS is limited, particularly close to session end times and when extensions are used. The RBA will review its alerting and processes to ensure that periods of property settlement inactivity are identified more quickly for action by the RITS Help Desk.

4. Identify and implement improvements to contingency contact arrangements

The incident demonstrated the need for more timely updates to contingency contact information during live events. While the RITS Help Desk currently conducts tests of contingency contacts on a quarterly basis, maintaining accurate and up-to-date contingency contact details remains a shared responsibility. The RBA will work with RITS members and AusPayNet to support more proactive updates to contact lists to support institutions to put in place more robust arrangements to keep their information current including through more proactive and timely updates to their contact lists.

5. Contingency planning and management

The incident highlighted the importance of clear and well-understood industry contingency arrangements, including when financial institutions should activate their own contingency procedures. Through the Industry Resilience Initiative (IRI), the RBA will continue to work with AusPayNet and the industry to uplift contingency and resilience arrangements, including scenarios and playbooks where RBA services are unavailable and scenarios requiring institutions to invoke contingency arrangements.

6. Efficiency improvements for RITS session extensions

During the incident, repeated short session extensions created operational uncertainty for some institutions. The RBA will review its criteria and guidelines, including for scenarios where longer extensions would provide more operational certainty than multiple incremental extensions. Some judgement will continue to be required depending on the nature of the issue.

7. Enhance communications during incidents

Feedback indicated that RBA communications during the incident could have more clearly conveyed the severity of the issue and expectations for updates. The RBA will review its procedures for external communications during and after outages to improve how incident severity is communicated and how expectations are set regarding the timing of stakeholder and public updates.

8. Review LVCS documentation, reconciliation and recovery arrangements

The incident highlighted the need for clear reconciliation and recovery arrangements for members using the LVCS. The RBA will work with financial institutions to strengthen these arrangements. The RBA will also consider enhancements to documentation supporting LVCS users, including roles and responsibilities during an LVCS disruption.

Industry Communication

The RBA used its external crisis communication system to provide updates to RITS and FSS contacts and supported AusPayNet through activation of its Crisis Communication Plan. Eleven AusPayNet Crisis Management Team (CMT) meetings were held. The RBA issued a media release acknowledging the incident and recovery efforts on 29 January.²

A record of the AusPayNet CMT meetings and timing of external notifications is set out in Appendix 2.

² See [Technology Outage | Media Releases | RBA](#)

Appendix 1: Sequence of Events

Event Time	Event Description
09:45	Alerts received indicating database connection errors, including with the file transfer system.
09:48	Internal incident bridge convened and investigations commence. Affected services identified as including LVCS, LVSS and property batches.
10:00	Technical verifications confirm no other RITS and FSS impacts.
10:36	Investigation identified potential expired intermediate certificate.
11:30	Expired intermediate certificate on database platform confirmed as the likely direct cause of the outage.
13:00	Plan to install valid intermediate certificate prepared and ready to be tested in Pre-Production Environment.
14:13	Fix implemented and verified successfully in Pre-Production Environment.
15:25	RITS maintenance advice issued notifying RITS members of 30-minute RITS downtime and extension of Day Session to 17:00.
16:00	Maintenance window begins to implement fix in Production Environment.
16:03	RITS processing stopped. Settlement of HVCS and Austraclear transactions unavailable.
16:15	Valid intermediate certificate installed in the database Production Environment.
16:28	RITS processing restarts. Settlement of HVCS and Austraclear transactions recommences.
16:38	LVCS and LVSS processing recommences.
17:17	Property batch settlement recommences.
18:15	Performance degradation observed for the file transfer system under high volume.
19:09	Duplicate files received while the system was under heavy load were not handled by duplicate checking process.
19:10	File transfer system restarted to improve performance.
19:32	Property settlement stops in RITS but is undetected by RITS alerts.
20:34	RITS Help Desk notified of issue with property settlement by the batch administrator and investigations commence.
21:35	Property reservation and settlement batch processes restarted but fail to resolve the issue.
21:55	Error with handling of 126 duplicate property files identified as likely cause of issue.
22:10	RBA completed manual steps to restore property settlement processing.
22:24	Property settlement fully restored.
22:45	RITS closes for settlement (following a 45-minute extension).

Source: RITS Help Desk

Appendix 2: Record of External Communications

Table A1 records external communications from the RBA during the incident, and the timing of AusPayNet CMT meetings.

Table A1: External Communications

Time issued, 24-hr format

	SMS/Email to Members		CMT Meetings	RBA Media Release
27 January	10:33	15:28	13:00	
	11:07	16:04	14:30	
	11:45	16:35	15:45	
	12:20	17:41	17:30	
	13:12	18:34		
	14:35	23:54		
28 January			9:30	
			12:00	
			16:00	
			18:00	
29 January			10:00	12:45
			12:30	
			15:30	

Sources: RITS Help Desk; RBA website