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The topic I have been asked to talk about today is Australia as a capital exporter. At first blush, one might think that this will make for a pretty short talk, as I think we all understand that Australia is an overall capital importer – i.e. in net terms each year, capital flows into the country. This is the counterpart to the current account deficit, and follows from the balance of payments identity. The relationship between the current account deficit and capital inflow over the past 50 years is shown in Graph 1. For 30 years or so up to about 1980, the current account deficit cycled around an average of 2 per cent of GDP, and net capital inflow cycled around a similar figure. Over the past 20 years, however, both the current account deficit and net capital inflow have been much larger, averaging around 4 per cent of GDP.
To get to today's topic, we need to look at the gross flows of capital – i.e. inflows and outflows – that underpin the series on net capital inflow shown in Graph 1. What we see here (Graph 2) is that over the past 20 years, both inflows and outflows have increased sharply. In the 1950s, 60s and 70s, capital inflows averaged around 2 per cent of GDP, and capital outflows were negligible. This latter outcome should come as no surprise, as there was a whole raft of exchange controls designed to stop capital flowing out of the country. These were instituted in the lead up to World War II, with the purpose of conserving foreign exchange to support the War effort. That these exchange controls remained in place for forty years after the War gives some indication that concerns about capital outflow are not something new; they have been a feature of Australian economic discussion for much of the past 50 years.
The fixed exchange rate system that existed up to 1983 was at the heart of these concerns. That is, as a country that routinely ran a current account deficit, there was a constant pre-occupation about whether we would attract sufficient net capital inflow to fund that deficit. If we failed to do so, there would be a depletion of official reserve assets, which could eventually result in a balance of payments crisis. After exchange controls were removed in 1983, capital outflows increased sharply, and over the past 15 years or so have been averaging about 3 per cent of GDP. At the same time, capital inflows increased even more sharply, from around 2 per cent of GDP to around 7 per cent of GDP. In other words, what we saw after the removal of exchange controls and financial deregulation was a sharp increase in capital flows in both directions. This is not surprising, as the removal of financial controls allowed the Australian economy to become more integrated into the world financial system. The recent public debate about capital outflow seems to be focussed on two main issues. The first is the growing overseas investments of superannuation funds, and the second is the investment offshore by Australian companies. Let me deal with these in turn. As you can see in Graph 3, superannuation funds have been increasing the proportion of the assets held offshore since the late 1980s. In 1988, the proportion for balanced funds was around 15 per cent; now it is close to double that.
When one combines this rising ratio with a rapidly increasing size of superannuation fund assets, it is pretty easy to generate figures which show the potential for large capital outflows. Commentators sometimes use such calculations to draw pessimistic conclusions about the long-run prospects for the Australian dollar. Should we be worried about these overseas investments by superannuation funds? I would like to give three reasons why they may not be the problem that some commentators claim:
The second issue I highlighted earlier related to foreign direct investment abroad. Basically, this involves Australian companies setting up overseas subsidiaries or taking over foreign companies. This type of activity seems to cause national unease because there is a suspicion that investment overseas by Australian companies must be at the expense of our economy. In particular, there are concerns that jobs will be created overseas rather than at home or that Australia's biggest and best companies will move their operations overseas, leaving Australia as a branch economy. An indication of the extent to which this is a national concern is given by the fact that recently there have been two major studies of foreign investment abroad by Australian companies: one by the Productivity Commission and one by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade1 . Both found a very high level of foreign participation by Australian firms. Both also concluded that, on balance, foreign investment by Australian companies was a good thing for the economy. As well as the profits that flow from such operations, the studies found that there could also be positive spin-offs for firms' domestic operations. In most cases, companies undertook offshore investment because they had developed strong skills and expertise within their particular fields, which they could profitably take overseas. Negative reasons for moving operations overseas – e.g. because there was something wrong with the Australian business environment – seemed to be in a minority. Let me run briefly through the facts. Graph 7 shows the annual flows of direct foreign investment by Australians, measured as a per cent of GDP. The sharp increase over the past decade or two is clear. These flows are, on average, about the same size as the portfolio outflows by funds managers.
Which companies are undertaking this investment? The study by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade found that the bulk of foreign investment was undertaken by a relatively small number of large companies. When it listed the 100 largest companies ranked by size of revenue, assets and employment, it found that there were 26 companies which made all three lists. It took this group as being representative of large companies in Australia. Of these 26 companies, 20 had offshore operations and they accounted for 84 per cent of total foreign direct investment by Australians. Table 1 shows the proportion of overseas assets of each of these companies in 1999/2000 and five years earlier. Of the 20 companies with offshore operations, 15 increased the size of those operations over the five-year period, with offshore investment in 1999/2000 averaging 35 per cent of total assets, compared with 30 per cent in 1994/95.
The bulk of foreign direct investment by Australian firms is in the United States. Investment by Australian companies in the US at June 2001 was $95 billion or 55 per cent of total foreign direct investment (Graph 8). The second most important destination was the UK at 17 per cent, with Continental Europe, Asia and New Zealand all roughly similar at $13 billion or 8 per cent of the total.
I should note too that the US is also the main destination of portfolio outflows (i.e. offshore investments by funds managers) accounting for 46 per cent of the total of such flows. Europe is the next most important. Overall, the weighting patterns for portfolio flows are not too different from the weights in the MSCI World Index, which is not surprising given that this is the index that many funds managers benchmark themselves against.
The trends towards increased offshore investment by Australian companies is by no means unusual. Graph 10 shows that over the past decade, foreign direct investment by companies in all the large industrial countries, apart from Japan, increased sharply. The ratio of foreign direct investment to GDP roughly doubled in all these countries, as it did in Australia.
ConclusionLet me conclude by summarising a few key points:
Footnote
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