MEDIA RELEASE
No: 2002-05
Date: 4 March 2002
Embargo: For Immediate Release
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STATEMENT BY THE GOVERNOR, MR IAN MACFARLANE
AUSTRALIAN OFFICE OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT CROSS CURRENCY INTEREST
RATE SWAPS
It was brought to the attention of the Reserve Bank in mid 2000
that the Australian Office of Financial Management (AOFM) was planning
to make early repayments of US dollar borrowings in order to keep
its US dollar debt exposure at its trading benchmark of 15 per cent.
This would have involved sales of Australian dollars and purchases of
US dollars at a time when the foreign exchange market was very unsettled.
The Australian dollar had fallen by 15 per cent during the year to
date and was setting all-time lows nearly every month. Sales of Australian
dollars (either directly into the market or via the Reserve Bank) would
probably have speeded up the rate at which the currency was falling.
On 5 October, I wrote to the Secretary to the Treasury, advising
against the mechanical application of the 15 per cent benchmark.
I later spoke to the Treasurer and sent him a letter on 1 December.
On 6 December, I met with the Treasurer and the Secretary of the
Treasury to discuss the matter. At our December meeting I made the following
points:
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while the benchmark was binding on the AOFM, it was always the prerogative
of Treasury to change it whenever they thought it was having harmful
effects;
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it was always intended that macroeconomic policy considerations could
override considerations of profits or losses. The need to avoid exacerbating
the already large fall in the exchange rate was such a macroeconomic
consideration;
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it was doubtful, even on purely commercial grounds, whether terminating
swaps early and realising losses over the following months when the
Australian dollar was at historical lows would make sense in the long
term.
The benchmark was suspended accordingly, and a review of the strategy
for cross currency swaps was undertaken.
The Reserve Bank believed at the time, and still does, that our advice
to override the 15 per cent trading benchmark and adopt a more
gradual resolution, as market conditions permitted, was correct. Macroeconomic
policy considerations will always be more important than portfolio allocation
rules. In any event, now that the foreign exchange market has settled,
it is clear that the December 2000 decision to override the benchmark
did not materially affect the size of the accumulated losses.
Enquiries:
Mr R. Battellino
Assistant Governor (Financial Markets)
(02) 9551 8210
Dr R. Rankin
Head of International Department
(02) 9551 8410
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